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The statistically typical form of the board of directors in a Russian joint-stock corporation 
can be characterized as an open managerial supervisory body with a balanced membership 
of executive corporate officers and outsider directors.    In reality, however, there are only a 
very limited number of Russian firms with this “average” type of corporate boards.  The 
vast majority of Russian joint-stock corporations are either governed by a board of 
directors with an extremely high outsider directorship or completely dominated by insider 
directors.  Behind this polarization in board composition lie heated struggles for 
supremacy among management, stockholders, and outsider directors.  In stark contrast to 
corporate systems in developed countries, which ensure effective managerial discipline 
through the spontaneous systemization of a well-balanced corporate governance structure, 
those in Russia, which are entrenched by deep-seated mutual distrust between insiders and 
outsiders, tend to cause excessively time- and energy-consuming conflicts.  In this sense, 
the distinctive adaptability of the bargaining model in transitional Russia reflects the 
underdevelopment of its social and economic system. 
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English translation. 1. Introduction 
Despite the clear fact that a general shareholders’ meeting is a supreme 
decision-making organ within a corporation, few challenge the argument by Jensen 
(1993) that a board of directors plays the most important role in the internal control 
system.  In the modern corporate system separating management from ownership, 
“boards are the overlap between the small, powerful group that runs the company and a 
huge, diffuse, and relatively powerless group that simply wishes to see the company 
run well” (Monks and Minow, 1996, p.167).  Accordingly, the primary mission of 
directors is to supervise the corporate management on behalf of shareholders by 
adhering to their duties of due care and loyalty.  In other words, if the responsibility 
of senior managers can be defined as making decisions at their own discretion 
regarding business operations, that of the board of directors can be defined as 
exercising their control over such management decisions.    Only this division of power 
prevents the management from being the sole evaluator of the business performance, 
and it also ensures the safeguards of invested shareholder capital (Baysinger and 
Hoskisson, 1990). 
In Russia, competition in a product market is not sufficiently intense in many 
industries.  Both the capital market and the market of corporate control remain 
underdeveloped in this country.  Under these circumstances, it is expected of Russia 
to establish an internal control system that is as powerful and functional as that of 
developed countries in order to effectively promote discipline in corporate 
management.  Russian corporations have a propensity to underestimate the roles of 
boards of directors due to their much stronger ownership concentration and much 
higher proportion of managerial ownership compared with Western firms.  As 
Williamson (1983) states, different governance mechanisms may be substituted for 
each other in reducing the agency costs incurred in the relationship between owners 
and managers.  At the same time, they each play a complementary role that is 
specifically effective in certain aspects or stages of the agency problems.  These 
characteristics are applicable to boards of directors relative to issues such as the 
protection of minority shareholders, which is one of the most serious concerns being 
faced by corporate governance in Russia.  Therefore, it is impossible to place too 
much emphasis on the importance of management supervision by corporate boards and 
their members in Russian companies. 
Meanwhile, the role of a board of directors cannot be limited to the monitoring 
of management even in a broad sense, including CEO appointment and turnover, 
financial performance assessment, and decision-making about managerial 
remuneration.  As a hierarchically superior body over management, a board of 
directors also has an important function to provide management expertise that helps 
with decisions in developing high-level corporate strategies and to advise and 
recommend issues regarding management activities (Baysinger and Butler, 1985).    In 
addition, as implied by Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), a corporate board works as a 
tournament place or a training site for CEO candidates.  Accordingly, a board of 
directors is not necessarily comprised of persons whose role is limited to managerial 
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always account for a majority of board membership because corporations naturally use 
other governance mechanisms when alleviating a conflict between owners and 
managers, leading to the optimization of board functions.    In fact, the board structure 
differs depending on the region, country, economic system, industrial sector, market, 
corporate form, and business activity of the company. 
To understand this organizational diversity, the economics of corporate boards 
has established a firm theoretical foundation that is based on agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983) but espouses the theory of 
property rights (Demzets, 1967; Alchian and Demzets, 1972) and other management 
theories, such as the resource-dependent theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Pfeffer, 
1981) and the Stewardship theory (Barney, 1990; Muth and Donaldson, 1998).  In 
addition, it has continued to develop its empirical tools through interaction mainly with 
research works of American and European companies, which have a certain level of 
generality that can be applicable to developing economies and transition economies, 
including that of Russia. 
The first objective of this paper is to test the suitability of economic and 
organizational logic in industrialized countries for enterprises in Russia, which is still 
far from being a mature capitalist state.  In other words, the primary objective is to 
identify the achievement of the systemic transformation to a market economy in Russia 
through a comprehensive examination of the appropriateness of applying the theories 
of board composition to Russian firms.    In this research field, Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998) propose a bargaining hypothesis in which the structure and functions of a 
corporate board are simultaneously and endogenously determined through a bargaining 
process between the CEO and other directors, presenting a different theoretical model 
from the traditional agency theory that implicitly assumes the harmonie préétablie 
nature of the self-organization of corporate boards.  This bargaining model seems to 
be a good fit for enterprises in Russia, where a struggle for power takes place in every 
social setting.  With this in mind, the second objective of this paper is to check the 
applicability of the Hermalin and Weisbach model to Russian firms by analyzing an 
explicitly hypothesized endogenous relationship among three board components, 
namely, (a) board size; (b) proportion of outsider directors; and (c) probability of the 
appointment of an outside chairman, while paying close attention to the bargaining 
power of managers and directors as a determinant of the board formation. 
In addition to the two objectives stated above, we also propose and empirically 
validate several theoretical hypotheses concerning the correlation of the board 
composition in Russian firms with the special features of the corporate law and 
transition economy in Russia, making a new contribution to organizational economics 
and economics of transition as the third objective.  A literature survey of corporate 
governance in Russia (Iwasaki, 2007a) reveals that, although several papers deal with 
corporate boards in the former state-owned enterprises and newly established 
corporations in the transition period, including pioneering works by Dolgopyatova 
(1995), Blasi and Shleifer (1996), Afanasiev, Kuznetsov, and Fominykh (1997), and 
Filatotchev, Wright, and Bleaney (1999), most of the prior studies merely imply the 
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composition of Russian corporations.  Consequently, there are virtually no empirical 
works that examine the impacts of other possible factors on the Russian corporate 
boards, contrary to the case of research studies regarding enterprises in developed 
countries. Therefore, in this paper, an attempt is made to chart these unexplored 
research areas for understanding the Russian transition economy. 
In order to fulfill the three objectives stated above, we utilized the results of an 
enterprise survey conducted in 2005 throughout Russia by a Japan-Russia joint 
research team from Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo and State University – Higher 
School of Economics in Moscow, as the basis for the empirical analysis in this paper.  
The survey was performed over a 5-month period from February to June 2005, and 822 
members of top management from industrial and communications enterprises from 64 
federal districts were interviewed.
1    It was the first large-scale questionnaire survey of 
Russian firm ever conducted. All samples are joint-stock companies, and the average 
number of workers per company is 1,884 (standard deviation: 5,570; median: 465).  
The total number of workers of these surveyed firms is 1,549,008, and they accounted 
for 10.3% of the average workforce in both the industrial and the communication 
sectors through 2004 according to official statistics (Rosstat, 2005).  Furthermore, 
regarding the regional and sectoral composition of the surveyed firms, they form a 
representative sample of Russian medium and large-scale enterprises.  The survey 
results include information on the board sizes, basic attributes of board directors, and 
methods used for the appointment of board chairmen, making it possible to carry out a 
detailed investigation of 741 board chairmen and 4,818 directors.
2  In addition, 
databases belonging to SKRIN and SPARK Co., both of which are major company 
information agencies in Russia, were used in this study with respect to the financial 
performance and the percentage of ownership shares held by the managers and 
directors of our sample firms.    This was done so that the empirical analyses would be 
compatible with those in earlier studies on listed companies in developed countries. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the 
legal framework of the board composition in Russian joint-stock companies.    Section 
3 captures the general characteristics of board structure based on the results of the joint 
enterprise survey.  Section 4 empirically analyzes the determinants of board 
composition.    Section 5 examines the endogeneity of board formation and the overall 
robustness of the estimation results.  The concluding section summarizes the major 
implications of the findings. 
 
2. Legal Framework of the Boards of Directors of Joint-Stock Companies in 
Russia 
In Russia, the legal basis for joint-stock companies is provided by the provisions of the 
                                                        
1    94.8% of those interviewed in our survey were company presidents (or CEOs or general 
directors) or vice presidents.  The remaining respondents were board chairmen (1.6%) 
and senior managers responsible for corporate governance affairs (3.6%). 
2    For more details, see Dolgopyatova and Iwasaki (2006). 
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supplemented by the Corporate Governance (CG) Code.
3  The overall legislative 
structure of Russia’s joint-stock companies, including the roles of the board of 
directors and its sharing of power with the executive body, has been examined in detail 
in Iwasaki (2007b).    Therefore, this section focuses on matters closely connected with 
board formation.
4  
According to corporate law, not all joint-stock companies founded in Russia are 
required to establish a board of directors.    Article 64 of the Law on JSCs provides that 
the general shareholders’ meeting of a joint-stock company whose voting shares are 
held by fewer than 50 persons may perform the same functions as those of the board of 
directors.  This measure is construed as a legal device for enabling comparatively 
small companies directly managed by their shareholders to avoid establishing an 
unnecessary corporate organ and to reduce management costs (Tsepov, 2006, p.158). 
The number and appointment of board members are determined exclusively by 
an ordinary resolution of a shareholders’ meeting (Law on JSCs, Art. 48(1), Para. 4).  
Nevertheless, there are strict legal requirements as to the minimum number of directors 
providing that companies with 10,000 or more voting shareholders must have no fewer 
than 9 directors, those with 1,000 or more and fewer than 10,000 voting shareholders 
must have no fewer than 7 directors, and those with fewer than 1,000 voting 
shareholders must have no fewer than 5 directors (Art. 66(3)).
5  On the other hand, 
there is no statutory upper limit on the number of directors.  The term of office for 
directors is one year (defined as the date of appointment to the date of the next year’s 
shareholders’ meeting), and all of their seats must be contested at a regular 
shareholders’ meeting to be held no earlier than two months and no later than six 
months from the last date of the fiscal year (Art. 47(1)).  In other words, a staggered 
board is not allowed in Russia, unlike in the US and France where such a system is 
                                                        
3  These provisions refer to Part I, Chapter 4 (Art. 96 to 104) of the Civil Code of 
November 30, 1994 (effective on January 1, 1995), the Federal Law on Joint-Stock 
Companies of December 26, 1995 (effective on January 1, 1996), and the resolution of 
the Federal Commission for the Securities Market dated April 4, 2002 regarding the 
recommendation of the adoption of the Corporate Governance Code.    This section was 
written taken into account the laws and regulations that were effective in Russia during 
the period of the 2005 enterprise survey.   
4    In Russia, there is a very unique legal form of incorporation called “workers’ joint-stock 
company (people’s enterprise).”    Although the management and supervisory system of 
a workers’ JSC is a very interesting research area in organizational economics, it is not 
investigated in this paper.  Therefore, all four workers’ JSCs that participated in our 
enterprise survey were totally excluded from the scope of the empirical study conducted 
in this paper. 
5 The regulations applicable to joint-stock companies with fewer than 1,000 voting 
shareholders as to the number of board members are comparatively new rules enforced 
by the amendment of the Law on JSCs in February 2004.  There had been no 
regulations of this kind before the amendment.  Telyukina (2005, pp.421-422) points 
out that the purpose of this amendment, by which stricter statutory upper limits were 
placed as to the number of board members, was to further protect the interests of 
minority shareholders. 
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protecting the interests of minority shareholders (Art. 66(4)).
6  Every  shareholder  who 
holds one-fiftieth or more of the total issued shares (2% or more voting equity) has a 
right to nominate directors (Art. 53(1)).  Shareholders with one-tenth or more of the 
total issued shares also have the right to convene an extraordinary shareholders’ 
meeting and file a motion seeking the replacement of incumbent directors (Art. 55(1)). 
A board chairman is elected among the directors approved at a shareholders’ 
meeting by a simple majority.    Directors may replace their chairman at any time by a 
resolution adopted by the majority of their votes unless otherwise stipulated in the 
articles of incorporation (Law on JSCs, Art. 67(1)). 
The most distinctive feature of the management and supervisory bodies of 
Russian joint-stock companies lies in comparatively strict restrictions regarding 
managers assuming board memberships.  The Law on JSCs strictly prohibits the top 
manager (single executive organ) from serving as his/her company board chairman, 
and members of the collective executive organ (management/administration division), 
which consists of senior managers, from accounting for one-fourth or more of the 
board membership (Law on JSCs, Art. 66(2)).
7  In addition, members of the audit 
committee established as a subordinate organ to the general shareholders’ meetings for 
the purpose of investigating financial and management activity may not become board 
members (Art. 85(6)).  In major industrialized countries, the systems of corporate 
governance can be divided into two types: “a two-tier system,” in which the executive 
function is separate from the supervisory function, and “a single-tier system,” in which 
a single organ assumes both of these functions.    In the case of Russia, the governance 
system can be characterized as a hybrid (Polkovnikov, 2002, p.141): it is not as 
independent as supervisory organs in German stock companies, but it is more 
independent than those found in Anglo-American corporations, as seen in the 
restrictions on the assumption of concurrent posts by executive officers. 
The Russian Law on JSCs, however, includes no provision prohibiting the board 
chairman from being elected from among insider directors and also allows joint-stock 
companies to determine at their own discretion whether to establish a collective 
executive organ (Art. 69(1)).  It have been already pointed out soon after the 
enactment of the Law on JSCs in 1996, it became clear that joint-stock companies 
                                                        
6  The February 2004 amendment of the Law on JSCs made it mandatory for all 
joint-stock companies to elect board members by cumulative voting, aiming at 
strengthening the protection of the interests of minority shareholders.  Until the 
amendment, the cumulative voting procedure had been enforceable only on joint-stock 
companies with 1,000 or more voting shareholders. 
7  A collective executive organ headed by a company president is an internal executive 
organization, and its function is, together with a single executive organ, to supervise 
daily management matters except for those that fall within the authority of the 
shareholders’ meetings and the board of directors (Law on JSCs, Art. 69(2)).  It is 
assumed that the presence of a collective executive organ functions to clarify managerial 
responsibilities and to make the board of directors more independent from the 
management of the company (Iwasaki, 2007b). 
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managers by not establishing a collective executive organ.  As explained in another 
paper (Iwasaki, 2007b), the adoption of a corrective executive organ requires an 
amendment of the articles of incorporation and is determined by a supermajority 
resolution at a general shareholders’ meeting (passed by a majority of not less than 
three-quarters of the votes of present shareholders owning a majority of voting shares), 
making it highly possible for managers to attempt to reject requests from outside 
investors to increase the level of managerial monitoring in collusion with affiliated 
companies and employees.  It is also possible that a top manager with significant 
ownership could appoint an individual under his/her influence to a board 
chairmanship. 
The CG Code is a kind of government decree issued by the Federal Commission 
for Securities Market (FCSM) in April 2002.    The CG Code, which was compiled by 
government officials and experts on the basis of the OECD’s Corporate Governance 
Principles, stipulates rules to be followed by all joint-stock companies operating in 
Russia with regard to matters pertaining to corporate management, basic principles of 
corporate governance (Chapter 1), and the settlement of internal disputes (Chapter 10).   
The CG Code devotes much space to matters regarding the board of directors setting 
forth detailed rules on board composition as well as on how to appoint board members 
(Chapter 3, Section 2).  The CG Code, however, contains very few provisions 
referring to the numerical targets on board composition, one of which mandates 
joint-stock companies to include in their articles of incorporation a provision setting 
forth that they must have at least three “independent directors”
8 who account for no 
less than one-fourth of the board membership (Section 2.2.3).
9    The CG Code has yet 
to produce much effect because it is a comparatively new government decree with no 
legal binding force.  Nevertheless, it is also a fact that some securities exchanges 
closely examine whether domestic corporations that have applied for listing their stock 
or issuing their bonds are compliant with the code, in accordance with administrative 
directions issued by the FMCS.
10  Therefore, the CG Code possibly has some 
                                                        
8 The CG Code defines an “independent director” as one who meets seven criteria for 
independence, which include (a) that the director has not been a manager or an 
employee of the company over which he/she assumes the directorship or its parent 
company for three years before the date of appointment; (b) that the director is not an 
affiliate of the company; and (c) that the director is not a representative of the 
government. 
9 The CG Code strongly recommends joint-stock companies to set up a subordinate 
committee of the board of directors.  A 2001 joint survey by the FCSM and the 
Institute for Stock Market and Management covering 56 major enterprises, however, 
revealed that only one of those surveyed firms had such a subordinate committee.  
Thus, this governance system has not yet been widely adopted even among large 
companies in Russia (The Federal Commission for Securities Market and the Institute 
for Stock Market and Management, 2002). 
10 It was confirmed by an interview survey at the Russian Trade System (RTS) Stock 
Exchange, which was jointly conducted by the author and Naohito Abe in August 2003 
(Iwasaki, 2003). 
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In summary, the discussions in this section call attention to the necessity of 
analytical consideration to the following points: (a) the lower limits of board sizes; (b) 
the prohibition of the top manager from concurrently assuming a board chairmanship; 
(c) the prohibition of other executive directors from concurrently assuming board 
membership; (d) the mandatory adoption of the cumulative voting system and other 
measures for protecting the rights of minority shareholders; and (e) the governmental 
recommendations on the appointment of independent directors. 
 
3. The Structure of Russian Corporate Boards: A Statistical Overview 
With the aforementioned features of the legal framework of the corporate board of 
Russian joint-stock companies in mind, we attempt, here, to grasp the general 
characteristics of board composition based on the results of our enterprise survey. 
As already mentioned, in Russia, joint-stock companies with fewer than 50 
voting shareholders may determine at their discretion whether or not to set up a board 
of directors.  Of the 298 surveyed firms whose total number of shareholders 
immediately before the survey was known to us, 46 (15.4%) had fewer than 50 
shareholders, including 3 (1.0%) without a board of directors.   The average (median) 
number of shareholders for these three firms was only 1.3 (1), much smaller than 18.1 
(14) for the other 43 enterprises.
11    This difference is statistically significant (t=-1.665, 
p=0.051 (one-sided); Wilcoxon Z =-2.356, p=0.019).  Hence, there are only a few 
companies with an extremely small shareholder base that do not have a board of 
directors despite the institutional consideration allowing small firms not to set one up. 
Of the 822 surveyed firms, 730 (88.8%) responded to our questions regarding 
their board size and the basic attributes of their board members.  As Table 1 
demonstrates, as of the first half of 2005, joint-stock companies in Russia have had an 
average number of 6.6 board members (standard deviation: 2.4, median: 7), of which 
only 10.4% (76) have 10 or more board members.  These figures have been stable 
throughout the transition period and are consistent with the results of past surveys by 
Blasi and Shleifer (1996), Dolgopyatova (2003), and Yasin (2004).  Compared with 
approximately 8,500 enterprises in 19 countries throughout the world surveyed in 20 
prior studies, the average board size of Russian companies is smaller than that of large 
listed firms in the US and other major developed countries but almost the same as that 
of newly listed firms in those large nations and that of listed companies in small 
countries (Table 2).  Considering that most of the enterprises covered by our survey 
                                                        
11  These numbers are based on the SKRIN database on the total number of shareholders as 
of Q4 2004 or Q1 2005.  These data do not provide the exact number of voting 
shareholders at the time of our survey; however, this would not result in a serious bias in 
the analyses conducted in this paper in view of the facts that the list of shareholders 
expected to be present at a shareholders’ meeting must be finalized 45 to 65 days prior 
to the date of the meeting (Law on JSCs, Art. 51(1)), our survey was conducted before 
the high season of shareholders’ meetings, and nonvoting shares are not very common in 
Russia. 
  7were non-listed companies, it can be said that Russian corporations are expanding the 
scale of their internal organs, following the past path of major western countries. 
Figure 1 demonstrates that the board sizes of Russian enterprises are influenced 
by the abovementioned legal restrictions as to the minimum required number of board 
members according to the number of shareholders.  In fact, of the 730 joint-stock 
companies, as many as 520 firms, or 71.2%, have a total of 5, 7, or 9 board members.   
Looking again at the 273 samples of which the total number of shareholders is known 
to us, 196 (71.8%) of them fall into the same category.    We classified these 196 firms 
into three subgroups, i.e., 5-, 7-, and 9-board member companies, and then calculated 
the average number of shareholders for each of these subgroups.  The results were 
that the average numbers of shareholders for 5-, 7-, and 9-board member companies 
were 605.4 (standard deviation: 1,356.0; median: 200), 3,212.2 (standard deviation: 
16,856.6; median: 854), and 3,988.6 (standard deviation: 5,052.3; median: 2,073.5), 
respectively.  This suggests that there are not a few joint-stock companies that have 
much fewer than 10,000 shareholders but have 9 board members.    In fact, although a 
Kruskal-Wallis test, which is a nonparametric multiple comparison method, identified 
significant differences in the medians among these three subgroups (χ
2=34.250, 
p=0.000), no significant difference was found by a Scheffe multiple comparison test 
between the 7-board member subgroup and the 9-board member subgroup (χ
2=3.484, 
p=0.175).
12    Furthermore, 25 (9.16%) of these 273 companies either had fewer than 5 
board members, in violation of the Law on JSCs, Article 66(3), or had a smaller or 
larger number of board members than the applicable minimum number stipulated in 
the same provision.  Likewise, as shown in Figure 1, 67 (9.18%) of a total of 730 
respondents had fewer than 5 board members.  These facts suggest that the actual 
board sizes in Russian companies are greatly affected by their managerial judgments 
on various factors as well as by the social characteristics of transition Russia, such as 
indifference to legal amendments or lack of law-abiding behavior on the part of 
citizens and corporations.   
Figure 2 and Table 1 show the breakdown of 4,818 board members from the 
730 surveyed firms by classifying them into six groups and the basic statistics by each 
of these attributes.  From this onwards, a director appointed from among company 
managers, rank-and-file employees, and representatives of a labor union is called an 
“insider director,” and a director characterized by other attributes is called an “outsider 
director.”  It should be noted that no distinction was made between affiliated and 
non-affiliated persons with regards to outsider directors (except for independent 
directors) due to constraints of the methodology used for our survey. 
According to the survey results, the board of directors in a typical joint-stock 
company consists of an average of 3.2 insider directors and 3.4 outsider directors.  
Contrary to the common understanding, Russian corporate boards, at least on the 
                                                        
12 A standard ANOVA test indicated that the differences in mean values among the three 
subgroups were not significant (F=1.110,  p=0.332), while a Bartlett test strongly 
rejected the null hypothesis of equality of the variances (x
2=249.202, p=0.000).  Hence, 
the analysis here relies solely on the results of a nonparametric test. 
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insider directors are those appointed among senior managers.    Insider directors of this 
type account for 43.9% of all directors.    They get positions in 640 (87.7%) of the 730 
surveyed enterprises.    However, 152 or 23.8% of these 730 companies have only one 
insider director with a managerial background (probably, a top manager).   
Unexpectedly, companies with (an) insider director(s) representing the interests of 
workers or of a labor union account only for 16.0% (117 companies) of all our 
samples. 
On the other hand, 75.6% of outsider directors are those representing private 
outsider owners, of whom 240 or 12.9% are those assuming directorship for the 
interests of minority shareholders.  This may be a positive outcome from the 
introduction of mandatory cumulative voting.  Of the 730 surveyed firms, 481 
(65.9%) have an average number of 3.9 (standard deviation: 2.3; median: 4) directors 
representing private outside shareholders.    As for independent directors, they account 
for 6.5% of all directors and 12.7% of all outsider directors.  However, only 138 
(18.9%), or nearly one-fifth, of the 730 surveyed enterprises have (an) independent 
director(s).  Despite active efforts by the FCSM, independent directors are still not 
common in Russia.  As in the case of independent directors, the proportion of 
government directors is quite small, accounting for 6.0% of all directors and 11.7% of 
all outsider directors.  Although no statistical ground is presented here due to space 
limitations, we confirmed that government directors are intensively sent to large-scale 
former state-owned enterprises operating in strictly regulated industries. 
The results of struggles among these interested parties reflect the extent of 
outsider directorship.  The average proportion of outsider directors for the 730 
responding enterprises stands at 48.9% (standard deviation: 35.3%, median: 55.6%).  
As shown in Table 2, this level is nearly the same as that for listed firms in the UK, US, 
China, and the Asia-Pacific region, much lower than that for companies in the 
European continent, and much higher than that for Japanese companies.    Considering 
that most of our surveyed firms are non-listed, it can be said that typical Russian 
companies have the same level of “openness” as those in industrialized countries 
despite their stereotype of being insider-dominating. On the contrary, Figure 3 
demonstrates that firms with statistically “typical” boards are minor in all our samples.   
Therefore, it would be quite appropriate to perceive the reality of Russian enterprises 
from the viewpoint of a polarization in terms of the percentage of outsider directors. 
As we mentioned in the previous section, Russian law strictly prohibits a top 
manager from concurrently assuming board chairmanship, which, however, does not 
mean that all insider directors are not allowed to become a board chairman.  
Furthermore, in Russia, vertical or horizontal business integrations, including 
participation in holding companies or business groups through stock ownership, are 
becoming more prevalent in a dynamic context, prompting corporate managers to 
recruit someone from these business groups or partners who hold the post of 
chairmanship in their boards.    Taking this into account, this paper makes a distinction 
between an “insider chairman,” who is promoted within the company and might 
include a “quasi-insider chairman,” appointed as intended by a top manager from 
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other attributes.
13 
Figure 4 summarizes the answers from 741 enterprises that responded to our 
question as to how they appointed their board chairmen.  Although the balance of 
power between managerial directors and outsider directors is maintained in average 
Russian enterprises, 512 or 69.1% of all chairmen are insiders, 229 more or 38.2% 
higher than the number of outsider chairmen, suggesting that the bargaining power of 
company presidents and other senior managers has a significant amount of influence 
over the appointments of board chairmen, as asserted by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(1998).    Meanwhile, 79.9% (183) of outsider chairmen are former senior managers of 
other companies or those selected from among other companies, and the remaining 
20.1% (46) are former government officials or former parliament deputies, 
highlighting the close connection between the state and business sectors in Russia 
(Yakovlev, 2006). 
As already discussed, we assume an endogenous relationship among board size, 
the proportion of outsider directors, and the probability of outsider board chairman 
appointments.  The correction matrix in Table 3 indicates the possibility of such a 
relationship among these three components.  Both the correlation between the board 
size and proportion of outsider directors and the correlation between proportion of 
outsider directors and the probability of outsider board chairman appointment are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, while the significance of the correlation 
between board size and the probability of outsider chairman appointment stands at 
only the 25.9% level.  These relationships among board components are basically 
consistent with the findings of earlier studies. 
With its components being simultaneously determined, the composition of a 
board of directors can be influenced by various factors, including firm organization 
and business environment.    The level of such influence can be assessed by comparing 
different sample industries.  In fact, the surveyed firms belong to one of eight 
industrial sectors or to the communications sector; a Hotelling T
2 test identified a 
                                                        
13 Needless to say, the possibility cannot be denied that a business group or partner 
affiliated with a certain enterprise may place its representative on the enterprise’s board 
of directors in order to make that representative perform a pure monitoring role as an 
outsider.  If that is the case, however, the business group or partner would be more 
likely to seat their person on the enterprise’s board just as a board member, not as the 
chairman.    Moreover, when two companies are affiliated through cross shareholding or 
joint ownership and maintain a good relationship with each other, it would be quite rare 
for one company to place its representative on the other company’s board in defiance of 
the will of the other company’s management.  In addition, due to methodological 
constraints of our survey, it is impossible to tell whether or not the chairman of an 
enterprise appointed from among those working for its affiliated business group or its 
partner functions solely as a monitoring organ with the view of an outsider.  For these 
reasons, we categorized all of the chairmen of this type as quasi-insider chairmen in this 
study.  Meanwhile, supplemental examinations confirmed that the empirical evidence 
and the conclusions of this paper referred to from the next section onwards were not 
greatly affected even if these chairmen were treated as outsiders. 
  10significant difference at the 1% level (T
2 = 23.911, F=7.947, p=0.000) in the mean 
vector of three board components between industrial firms and communications firms, 
as detailed in Table 4.  This table also reveals subtle but certain sector-to-sector 
differences in the mean of each board component.  Both a comparative analysis of 
industrial firms and communications firms and an analysis of variance of the 9 sectors 
identified statistically significant differences in board size and the proportion of 
outsider directors.  On the other hand, there is no significant difference in the 
probability of outsider chairman appointment either between industrial firms and 
communication firms or among the 9 sectors.  These statistical facts suggest that the 
former two components are susceptible to be influenced by various factors 
differentiating one sector from another, whereas the appointment of a board chairman 
may be strongly affected by company-specific determinants outside the boundary of 
industries, such as internal control systems and the balance of power between 
managers and their opponents. 
 
4. The Determinants of Board Composition 
Now, with a clear understanding of the general characteristics of the board structure of 
Russian joint-stock companies and a reasonable understanding of the endogenous 
relationship among board size, number of outsider directors, probability of the 
appointment of an outsider chairman, and the factors that may affect these components, 
we will proceed to a theoretical and empirical examination on the determinants of 
board composition.  Subsection 4.1 presents testable theoretical hypotheses.   
Subsection 4.2 conducts empirical analyses. 
4.1. The logic of board composition 
Thanks to one-half of a century of studies by many researchers of organizational and 
financial economics, we now know the points to be considered in identifying the 
determinants of board composition, regardless of the company’s country.    At the same 
time, however, past studies have also put some stress on the socio-economic conditions 
and the legal system of the country in question.  This subsection contains testable 
hypotheses to be verified based on the results of the 2005 enterprise survey.  In 
addition, an interpretation of the traditional determinants of board composition in the 
Russian context is provided along with references to the particularities of Russia’s 
corporate law and its economy in transition. 
  Factors seriously affecting the board formation process can be divided into 
governance variables (GOVVARs) in a narrow sense and business-activity variables 
(BUSVARs).  Governance variables include those relating to firm organization, such 
as ownership structure and company size.  Business-activity variances consist of 
those relating to business type, competition environment, fund-raising activity, and 
financial performance.
14  GOVVARs can be further grouped into bargaining variables 
(BARVARs), reflecting the bargaining power of managers and that of interested parties 
                                                        
14 The business-activity variables include broadly defined governance variables, such as 
competition environment and capital structure. 
  11who are in conflict with the managers, and other variables.  In this paper, the other 
variables above are termed as agency variables (AGEVARs) for descriptive purposes 
following Authur (2001).  By hypothesizing an endogenous relationship among the 
dependent variables consisting of the board size (BOASIZ), proportion of outsider 
directors (SHAOUT), and probability of outsider chairman appointment (OUTCHA), 
the formula for the determination of board composition can be expressed in the 
following three functions: 
) , , , , ( BUSVARs AGEVARs BARVARs OUTCHA SHAOUT f BOASIZ
GOVVARs 4 4 48 4 4 47 6
= , 
) , , , , ( BUSVARs AGEVARs BARVARs OUTCHA BOASIZ g SHAOUT = , 
) , , , , ( BUSVARs AGEVARs BARVARs SHAOUT BOASIZ h OUTCHA = . 
Let us consider specific factors contained in the above three groups of variables 
and their possible impacts on board composition in more detail. 
4.1.1. Bargaining variables 
According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), the ownership share of board members 
and CEO tenure are the most representative bargaining variables.  Nevertheless, it 
would be more appropriate to regard the influence of a management group and that of 
major outside shareholders as bargaining variables as well by taking into account that 
Russian enterprises are managed in a more collective manner than Anglo-American 
corporations and are significantly influenced by a handful of large shareholders.  In 
other words, the conflict model “CEO versus outsider directors,” presented by 
Hermalin and Weisbach, needs to be expanded to read “managers’ group versus 
outsider directors plus major outsider shareholders” in order to thoroughly understand 
the actual state of a Russian corporation. 
The agency theory hypothesizes that the existence of major outsider 
shareholders renders supervision by outsider directors less necessary because these 
large shareholders have a sufficient incentive and capability to actively perform 
monitoring functions by exercising their influence when necessary or because they can 
discipline managers effectively by increasing the possibility of takeover by third 
parties (Rediker and Seth, 1995).  In fact, there are a number of earlier studies 
identifying a negative correlation between ownership concentration by outside 
investors and board independence (Li, 1994; Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith, 1997; 
Prevost, Rao, and Hossain, 2002; Erickson et al., 2005).  However, it is possible for 
shareholders to use their bargaining power to reinforce the monitoring function of the 
board with the aim of increasing their capability to collect managerial information or 
strengthening their authority to dismiss managers who fail to elevate corporate values, 
if they live in countries where the corporate control market is still underdeveloped, or 
it would be too costly to sell all of their shares (Whidebee, 1997).  In fact, there is 
actually a significant amount of empirical evidence supporting this hypothesis from 
preceding papers dealing with listed companies in Japan, where the capital market is 
functioning less effectively for the development of corporate governance than it is in 
Europe and the US and from research dealing with non-listed firms and emerging 
  12markets (Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Mak and Li, 2001; Roosenboom, 2005).  The 
current state of the Russian economy is clearly closer to that in Japan and emerging 
markets.  Furthermore, in the case of Russia, where social distrust towards corporate 
managers is quite high, it is highly possible that large shareholders tend to maximize 
their presence in their invested companies by using any channel available to them.  
Therefore, it is expected that the ownership share of major outsider shareholders is 
positively correlated with board size and independence, although the marginal effects 
of their additional share on the expansion of their voting rights may decrease.  In 
addition, as is the case with managers and directors, shareholders are possibly subject 
to entrenchment effects.  Consequently, it is presumed that ownership by large 
shareholders has a nonlinear impact on board composition. 
Many researchers provide detailed arguments for the possible influence of CEO 
ownership on board composition.
15    The agency theory assumes that CEO 
shareholding reduces the need for the corporate board to perform its managerial 
monitoring function as it creates an effect of the sharing of common interests between 
CEO and outside owners (convergence effect).  The bargaining hypothesis explains 
that a CEO’s increased bargaining power decreases the chances of outsider directors 
being appointed.  Thus, these theories support the idea that CEO shareholding 
reduces board size and independence.    Furthermore, both theories lead to expectations 
that CEO shareholding and board independence are negatively correlated with each 
other, which is based on the assumption that a CEO with a significant level of 
ownership actively and effectively hinders the appointment of outsider directors and 
the separation of CEO and board chairman positions due to an entrenchment effect that 
is greater than the convergence effect as well as the CEO’s significant voting power.  
The bargaining hypothesis, however, is distinguished from the agency theory, as the 
former predicts that, when the level of CEO ownership share is not high enough to 
give him/her complete control over director appointment process, outsider directors 
and owners exercise their bargaining power to the full extent to counter the CEO’s 
entrenchment behavior, resulting in an economically significant non-linear correlation 
between CEO ownership share and board size/independence.  Therefore, if the 
bargaining model works well in Russia, the function of the correlation between CEO 
ownership share and board size/independence is negatively linear and positively 
quadratic.  This prediction is also applicable to the shareholding by a management 
group or by an insider director.  On the other hand, it can be hypothesized that the 
ownership share of outsider directors affects board composition in the same way as 
that of major outsider owners. 
Meanwhile, as reported in the previous section, business alliances are now 
mushrooming in Russia both at the Federal level, as represented by financial-industrial 
groups led by commercial banks, major industrial enterprises, and newly emerged 
financial cliques called “oligarchs,” as well as at the regional level.  In fact, our 
                                                        
15 For instance, see Bathala and Rao (1995), Denis and Sarin (1999), Hanson and Song 
(2000), Arthur (2001), Filatotchev and Bishop (2002), Roosenboom (2005), and Fich 
(2005). 
  13survey indicates that 323 (39.3%) of the 822 surveyed firms are affiliated with a 
certain business group through shareholding.  The most important and, probably, the 
most dominant owners for these business groups are holding companies and core 
group firms whose corporate governance functions are drawing attention from 
researchers involved in the Russian economic studies (Iwasaki, 2007a).  While 
persons or organizations leading these business groups are responsible for monitoring 
their group companies, it is also a fact that they share the same destiny with affiliates.  
In other words, although holding companies or core group companies can provide an 
effective monitoring role over their subordinates, there is always a possibility of 
collusion among them with their affiliated firms, leading to a reduction in their 
shareholder wealth.  In theory, it is difficult to determine which one, the monitoring 
or the collusion effect, is greater.    However, as demonstrated in many studies, such as 
Kuznetsov and Muravyev (2000), Perotti and Gelfer (2001), and Guriev and Rachinsky 
(2005), which empirically found that affiliation with a business group helped a 
company to improve its managerial discipline and promote its restructuring activity, it 
is now commonly accepted among researchers that membership in a business group 
maintains sound corporate governance compared with independent enterprises.
16  
Hence, we also expect that the participation in a business group would function to 
enhance the monitoring role of a corporate board in the member companies in Russia. 
The tenure of the top manager can also be a bargaining variable.   A CEO with 
a wide range of personal connections and firm-specific skills that have been developed 
through his/her lengthy managerial career in the company always has strong 
bargaining power.  Such a long-standing top manager is expected to use his/her 
bargaining power to the full extent in order to give board membership to his/her loyal 
followers.  Therefore, it is presumed that the tenure of the top manager functions to 
control the monitoring function of the corporate board.  In contrast, a newly 
appointed top manager is more likely to have a large company board with a high 
proportion of outsider directors temporarily, which is probably because of his/her still 
weak influence on the director appointment process or because of his/her strategy to 
ask for managerial advice and counseling from outsiders until the company 
management is on track under his/her new leadership (Weisbach, 1988).  In the case 
of Russia, the social attention is now centered on new generations, who took over the 
positions of “red executives,” or former communist company bosses, who had long 
been dominant in the Soviet Union’s business sector since its socialist era.    Therefore, 
in this paper, we have investigated the impact of the appointment of new top managers 
on board structure. 
4.1.2. Agency variables 
Among the agency variables reflecting the organizational characteristics of Russian 
corporations, attention is given to the age level of top managers, the legal form of 
incorporation, the upper limits on shareholding and voting rights set by the articles of 
incorporation, the adoption of the collective executive organ, the political background 
                                                        
16 Avdasheva (2006) analyzed business integration issues using our survey results and 
obtained conclusions similar to those of earlier studies. 
  14behind a company’s foundation, and company size. 
First, over the past dozen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a mass of 
Russian corporate managers of the socialist generation has been approaching 
retirement age.  Therefore, the manner in which power is transferred to their 
successors is significant, since the managers could have a considerable impact on the 
process for appointing directors.  According to Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) and 
Baker and Gompers (2003), a company in the U.S. with a soon-to-retire CEO is more 
likely to accept the CEO’s successor as a member of its corporate board, resulting in a 
significant increase in the proportion of insider directors, although the impact of the 
acquisition of board membership by the successor on board size may be trivial.    Other 
empirical studies also assert that a retiring CEO has a strong tendency to assume board 
chairmanship, probably with the objective of making it easier to transfer power to the 
successor he/she deems most desirable (Mark and Li, 2001; Booth, Cornett, and 
Tehranian, 2002).  These hypotheses are worth testing empirically with respect to 
their applicability to Russian corporations. 
The second focus of the agency theory perspective is placed on the corporate 
forms of Russian joint-stock companies.  Mayers, Shivadasani, and Smith (1997) 
conducted a comparative analysis of joint-stock and mutual companies in the U.S. 
insurance sector and confirmed that the boards of directors of mutual companies 
perform a stronger monitoring function than those of joint-stock companies in order to 
achieve an adequate level of managerial discipline because, due to their limited share 
transferability, mutual companies have weaker alternative governance mechanisms to 
replace the role of corporate boards than joint-stock companies.    In the case of Russia, 
a person who intends to set up a joint-stock company must choose the legal form of 
incorporation between either an open company, whose shares can be freely traded, or a 
closed company, whose shares can be traded only among the promoters and other 
designated investors, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code, Article 97 
and the Law on JSCs, Article 7.
17    It is presumed that this difference in corporate form 
may affect board composition in a similar way to the aforementioned distinction 
between mutual companies and joint-stock companies.  Hence, we predict that the 
choice of an open joint-stock company is negatively correlated with board size and 
independence. 
Thirdly, attention must be paid to the possible effect of provisions in articles of 
incorporation regarding the ownership and voting rights of shareholders.  Russian 
corporate law allows a joint-stock company, regardless of its corporate form, to set an 
upper limit on the number or face value of shares or voting rights held by one 
shareholder in its articles of incorporation (Law on JSCs, Art. 11(3)).  Due to this 
legal arrangement, there are, indeed, many Russian enterprises that impose severe 
restrictions on the ownership and voting rights of shareholders.  In fact, our survey 
revealed that 104 (14.4%) of the 723 responding firms had an upper limit on ownership 
                                                        
17 For more details on this point, see Iwasaki (2007b).  In addition, Iwasaki (2007c) 
conducted an empirical analysis of the organizational choice of corporate form by 
Russian joint-stock companies using the same dataset as in this paper. 
  15per shareholder and that 125 (17.2%) of the 726 responding firms had an upper limit 
on the voting rights by one shareholder.  These limits, which are included in the 
articles of incorporation, probably for the purpose of allowing managers to monopolize 
their discretional authority, are likely to significantly undermine the voice of 
shareholders and, therefore, to affect board composition in favor of the interests of the 
managers. 
Fourthly, we must look at the collective executive organs of Russian joint-stock 
companies when analyzing the characteristics of their legal structures.  As explained 
in Section 2, the Law on JSCs has a provision that prohibits 25% or more board 
membership from being represented by collective executive organ members.  If 
managers are strictly compliant with the purpose of this provision, the establishment of 
a collective executive organ may restrain the selection of insider directors.  As 
already pointed out, however, there is a serious loophole in this provision.    Hence, we 
predict that the adoption of a corrective executive organ is negatively correlated with 
the board size and positively correlated with the board independence, but the statistical 
significance of its association is relatively low. 
The fifth point is closely connected with the current state of the Russian 
transition economy.  It is common knowledge that the vast majority of middle- and 
large-scale enterprises in Russia are privatized enterprises, many of which are still 
under state ownership.
18  These former state-owned enterprises, which used to be 
called “common properties shared by workers” in the Soviet era, still draw much more 
public attention than de-novo private firms.  Therefore, compared with 100% 
privately owned companies established during the transition period, traditional former 
state-run enterprises are likely to have more outsider directors in order to properly 
achieve their accountability to the state and the public as well as in order to receive a 
variety of support from the government (Li, 2004; Beiner et al., 2004).    Consequently, 
former state-owned corporations and newly established enterprises spun off from 
state-owned corporations or privatized corporations and using their assets are expected 
to have corporate boards with a higher level of independence than ordinary private 
enterprises ceteris paribus. 
The sixth point is company size, which is the most primary agency variable.  
The expansion of the organizational size of a company is accompanied by the 
diversification of firm organization and the expansion of the relationship among the 
company, state, and society.  In addition, company size expansion requires managers 
to improve their skills in various management areas, resulting in an increase in board 
size (Mayers, Shivdasani, and Smith, 1997; Denis and Sarin, 1999; Baker and 
Gompers, 2003).  On the other hand, there is disagreement among researchers as to 
whether additional directorships are more likely to be held by insiders or by outsiders 
                                                        
18  Of our randomly selected sample of 822 firms, 570 (69.3%) are previously state-owned 
enterprises, and 79 (9.6%) are newly established companies spun off from state-run 
enterprises or privatized enterprises.  In addition, of the 563 surveyed firms with 
inherited assets from the state, 105 (18.7%) have state ownership, although the degree of 
state owbership varies from company to company. 
  16(Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998; Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999; Agrawal and 
Kneober, 2001; Peng, 2004).  Furthermore, it is not obvious how company size 
affects the probability of a CEO concurrently assuming board chairmanship (Brickley, 
Coles, and Jarrell, 1997; Arthur, 2001; Booth, Cornett, and Tehranian, 2002).  Thus, 
we assume that the organizational size of a company has a positive impact on both the 
board size and the extent of outsider directorship and that the statistical significance of 
the impact on board size is greater than that on the proportion of outsider directors.  
In addition, considering that the appointment of a board chairman may be decisively 
dependent upon the bargaining process between managers and their opponents, we 
presume that it is difficult to find a significant impact of company size on the 
probability of outsider chairman appointment. 
4.1.3. Business-activity variables 
As business-activity variables, we treat business diversification, outside financing, 
market competition, R&D/innovation strategy, financial performance, debts, and 
business  internationalization.  The  effects  of these seven factors on board composition 
can be summarized as follows:
19 
Business diversification increases the chances of an expert familiar with the new 
market becoming a board member, although it is not clear from which group of persons 
the expert is selected.  In other words, business diversification is expected to have a 
significantly positive correlation with the number of appointed directors, whereas its 
effect on the proportion of outsider directors is not clear. 
Financing from capital markets encourages managers to make decisions in the 
interests of investors and helps resolve agency problems.  Information disclosure for 
fund-raising also has the effect of constraining the opportunistic behavior of managers.   
Furthermore, obtaining financing from capital markets increases the potential risk of 
hostile takeovers, leading to an improvement of managerial discipline.  Hence, it can 
be assumed that outside financing replaces the monitoring function of corporate boards.   
Conversely, however, the possibility cannot be denied that issuing stocks or corporate 
bonds on security markets leads to the appointment of fund-raising directors or to the 
addition of outsiders with expert knowledge about financial engineering.    Particularly 
in Russia, enterprises are strongly required by financial authorities and securities 
exchanges to establish an effective internal governance system in compliance with the 
CG Code, as described in Section 2.    Therefore, it must be examined inductively from 
the results of empirical analyses which hypotheses better account for the current state 
in Russia. 
Intensified competition on product markets results in the effective improvement 
of managerial discipline and also functions to replace the monitoring role of their 
corporate boards.  In contrast, companies with a monopolistic position within the 
market are expected to be more likely to appoint outsider directors in order to prevent 
the negligent and opportunistic behavior of managers and to check corporate strategies. 
                                                        
19 In addition to the prior studies already mentioned, see Hill and Snell (1988), Baysinger 
and Hoskisson (1990), and Borokhovich et al. (2004) for more detailed theoretical 
grounds and empirical evidence relating to these points. 
  17Performing an intensive R&D/innovation strategy encourages companies to 
evaluate the performance of their managers on the basis of the quality of their 
decisions rather than on the basis of financial results specific to the business they 
manage because of its technical uncertainty and risky nature.    In addition, it is insider 
directors who are the most appropriate for conducting such evaluations.  Hence, 
enterprises actively engaged in product development and innovation are expected to 
have a significantly lower number and proportion of outsider directors. 
A large number of researchers have repeatedly confirmed that a company that 
performs poorly compared with its rivals and other companies in the same trade has an 
impact on its dismissal of insider directors and its appointment of their successors from 
the outside regardless of differences in period and country (Harmalin and Weisbach, 
1998; Kaplan and Minton, 1994; Peng, 2004; Yeh and Woidtke, 2005).  Obviously, 
this impact is triggered by a reduction in the bargaining power of the CEO and senior 
managers that are responsible for poor performance.  In recent years, Russian 
investors have been paying more attention to company performance and investment 
efficiency against the background of the rapid economic development and its 
stock-trading boom in their country.  Our empirical analysis can be expected to 
present similar trends as those explained in these earlier studies.  Nevertheless, as 
reported by Yermack (1996), Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), Perry and 
Shvadasani (2005), and some other researchers, board size is rarely influenced by past 
performance, and it is possible that this can be applicable to Russian firms. 
Many earlier studies acknowledge that the higher the debt ratio of a company, 
the stronger the managerial monitoring function of its corporate board.  This is 
because increased monitoring pressure on the company from creditors trying to recover 
their credit without fail and from outsider owners afraid of bankruptcy has a strong 
effect on board composition.  Non-performing accounts payable and bank loans are 
still a serious economic concern in Russia despite the fact that its economy has already 
pulled out of the transitional recession (Kornai, 1994).
20    It is often the case in Russia 
that creditors become unable to recover their loans; therefore, it is quite reasonable to 
assume that creditors are subject to all possible kinds of monitoring pressure from their 
business partners and financing institutions.  For these reasons, we predict that bank 
loans and other debts have a statistically significant and positive impact on both the 
overall number of directors and the proportion of outsider directors. 
The remaining business-activity variable is business internationalization.   
Increased overseas operations and international transactions possibly lead the company 
to have more expert directors and foreign directors in order to gather information and 
know-how to deal with the foreign market and foreign business customs as well as in 
order to secure human contacts useful for expanding overseas operations.    In the case 
of Russia, where there are strict government regulations on major export commodities, 
enterprises actively involved in overseas business may be more inclined to employ 
those who are skillful in dealing with high-ranking officials and bureaucrats in the 
                                                        
20 In fact, the results of our survey found that, as of the first half of 2005, 333 (41.0%) of 
813 surveyed enterprises had arrears in their accounts payable. 
  18fields of trade and tariff affairs.    According to an analysis by Li (1994), who surveyed 
enterprises in 10 industrialized states, however, the share of overseas sales in total sales 
affects the proportion of outsider directors in a curvilinear way.  Hence, we expect 
that a high level of business internationalization has an obvious and positive impact on 
board size and independence. 
Meanwhile, following the same logic as that used for the previous discussions 
concerning the relationship between company size and the probability of outsider 
chairman appointment, we assume that all of these business-activity variables have, if 
any, a small or neutral effect on chairman appointment. 
4.1.4. Interaction of endogenous variables 
There may be possible interactions among endogenous variables, such as board size, 
proportion of outsider directors, and probability of outsider chairman appointment.  
With regard to this point, some research works mentioned in this paper suggest that 
companies with a larger corporate board are more likely to have more outsider 
directors.  The more pressure companies receive from the state and investors to 
improve their internal control system and increase the transparency of their 
management activities, the more likely they are to expand their board size, and, of 
course, the more likely they are to appoint an outsider as their board chairman.    Board 
chairmen appointed from the outside are expected to encourage the presence of 
outsider directors in an attempt to secure their influence over strategic decision-making 
and to enhance their comprehensive bargaining power against corporate managers.    If 
it is impossible to replace insider directors with outsider directors due to resistance by 
the management side, the board size may be enlarged by increasing the absolute 
number of outsider directors.  Analyzing these hypotheses holds a great deal of 
significance for corporate governance studies in Russia as well.  Therefore, we 
endeavor to explore how individual board components affect each other within Russian 
firms while controlling the impacts of the abovementioned governance and 
business-activity variables. 
Table 5 summarizes the theoretical discussions.  Next, we will describe 
empirical analyses that were conducted to substantiate these testable hypotheses. 
4.2. Empirical analysis   
This section verifies the validity of the economic logic of board composition explained 
in Subsection 4.1 in the case of Russian corporations by using the following datasets 
based on the results of the 2005 joint survey and on the SKRIN and SPARK databases. 
With regard to ownership of outsider owners and corporate officers, both of 
which are major bargaining variables, the 6-point scale of combined ownership share 
of corporate ownership and foreign investor (OWNOUT),
21 a large management 
                                                        
21  OWNOUT excludes all domestic individual shareholders in order to eliminate the impact 
of ownership by managers and employees’ families, relatives, and acquaintances, all of 
whom are categorized as outside owners in a formal sense and in order to accurately 
identify the level of ownership concentration by corporate owners and foreign owners, 
whose number is usually small in a Russian corporation. 
  19shareholder dummy with a value of 1 if the company has a specific manager or a 
specific managerial group as its major shareholder (MANSHA), and shares of CEO 
ownership, managerial group ownership, director ownership, and chairman ownership 
in total outstanding shares (OWNCEO,  OWNMAN,  OWNDIR, and OWNCHA, 
respectively) are utilized.  The presence of a business group as a major owner is 
represented by a group firm dummy (GROFIR) for participation in a holding company 
or a business group through share ownership, as well as by a core group firm dummy 
(GROCOR) and an affiliate firm dummy (GROAFF), in consideration of the possible 
asymmetrical effects of business integration due to the differences among member 
firms in their position within the group.  Moreover, a new appointment of a top 
manager is represented by a dummy variable (NEWCEO), which takes 1 for the sample 
firms with a top manager appointed in or after 2001. 
The dummy variables used for investigating the impacts of agency variables are 
CEOAGE, indicating that the enterprise has a top manager of retirement age (61 or 
older), OPECOM, which captures open joint-stock companies, LIMOWN, in which the 
company has an upper limit on ownership per shareholder in its articles of 
incorporation,
22  COLEXE, which takes a value of 1 if company adopts a collective 
executive organ, and PRICOM and SPIOFF, denoting that the company is a former 
state-owned (or ex-municipal) privatized enterprise or a newly-established firm spun 
off from a state-owned enterprise or a privatized firm, respectively.  Furthermore, 
COMSIZ, the natural logarithm of the total number of employees, is used in a series of 
regression analyses as a proxy for company size. 
Concerning the business-activity variables, the level of business diversification 
is measured by BUSLIN, which denotes the number of business lines in accordance 
with the 2-digit industrial classifications in the Russian All-Union Classifier of the 
National Economy Branches (“OKONKh”).
23  Financing from capital markets is 
expressed as MARFIN, a dummy variable, with 1 assigned to the enterprises that issued 
stocks or company bonds on domestic or foreign securities exchanges, and market 
competitiveness is expressed as NONCOM, a dummy variable for non-competing 
company, with 1 assigned to the enterprises that responded that they were not 
competing with any domestic company, any foreign-affiliated company, or any 
overseas company from any country or region. 
The impact of R&D/innovation activities on board composition is measured 
using NEWPRO, a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if a company successfully 
developed brand-new products or worked out innovation businesses.    The variables of 
                                                        
22  Of the surveyed firms with upper limits on ownership per shareholder, 63.5% also have 
restrictions on voting rights per shareholder in their articles of incorporation.    Thus, we 
will focus only on the effects of setting a limit on ownership per shareholder.  Almost 
the same results were obtained both when, instead of using LIMOWN, a dummy variable 
with a value of 1 for the samples with limits on voting rights per shareholder was used, 
and when, instead of using LIMOWN, a dummy variable for those with restrictions on 
either per-shareholder ownership or per-shareholder voting rights was utilized. 
23 It is said that these 2-digit classifications best measure the level of the non-related 
diversification (conglomerate) strategy. 
  20past financial performance include the rate of return on assets (ROAAVE), the average 
rate of gross profit on sales (PROAVE), and the frequency of dividend payments 
(DIVPAY).  These performance indices are predetermined variables reflecting the 
business results of our samples for a period of several years prior to the joint survey, 
which enables us to avoid any possible simultaneous bias between board composition 
and firm performance.  Meanwhile, ROAAVE and PROAVE take industry-adjusted 
values using a method proposed by Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998) and 
represent the distances from the median performance in each industry.  The formula 
is: 
( ) e Performanc e Performanc sign e Performanc adj ∆ × ∆ = , 
where ∆Performance is the value obtained by subtracting the median performance in 
the corresponding industry from the sample firm’s performance. 
The impact of debts on board formation is tested using BANCRE, a variable for 
the use of bank credits by the surveyed firms and their average length, and ARREAR, a 
variable accounting for the proportion of overdue accounts payable in total debts.  
EXPSHA, the share of total exports in total sales, represents the degree of business 
internationalization.  The definitions, descriptive statistics, and sources of the above 
datasets are listed in Table 6.  In the regression analyses, we also control the fixed 
effects in each industry using 8 industrial dummy variables.
24 
4.2.1. Board size 
Yermack (1996) maintains that a firm’s value is dependent upon the monitoring 
function level and decision-making quality of its corporate board, whereas its 
performance is significantly determined by its board size.    We will start our empirical 
analyses from this aspect of corporate boards. 
Column (a) of Table 6 shows the correlation coefficients between board size and 
independent variables that we have adopted.  All of the ownership variables – the 
major bargaining variables – have predicted signs with statistical significance.  The 
coefficient of GROCOR is relatively smaller and less statistically significant than that 
of GROAFF.    This implies that, in Russia, it is quite usual for core firms to place their 
representatives on the corporate boards of their affiliate companies for monitoring 
purposes, while, on the other hand, it is quite rare for the subordinates to have their 
own representatives in the strategic decision-making process by core firms.   A new 
top manager’s appointment dummy, NEWCEO, is positively correlated with board size, 
as we predicted, but at a lower significance level than the ownership variables. 
The coefficients of many of the agency variables also support our theoretical 
hypothesis.  Unexpectedly, however, the existence of a collective executive organ is 
positively and significantly correlated with board size.  Moreover, the correlation 
coefficients for newly established firms spun off from state-owned or privatized firms 
contradict the hypothesis, although the correlation is statistically insignificant. 
                                                        
24  They related to the intensity of state regulations and industry protection measures by the 
federal and local governments, the level of market concentration, and the degree of 
public interest in the industry (i.e., mass media and local citizens), among others. 
  21Looking at the business-activity variables, those for the number of business 
lines, gross profit rate, frequency of dividend payments, proportion of overdue loans, 
and overdue accounts payable in total debts have positive correlation coefficients with 
board size, which is consistent with our assumptions.    MARFIN is also positively and 
significantly correlated with board size.  Hence, it is presumed that issuing stocks or 
corporate bonds in securities markets may have the effect of encouraging the company 
to improve its governance system and that this impact may be greater than a 
managerial discipline enhancement effect exerted from the capital market itself. 
In order to verify whether the above relationships can be obtained even after 
controlling for other factors, we estimate the regression model expressed as 
 by ordinary least squares (OLS), where the natural log of board 
size (BOASIZ) is the explained variable and x and β are the vectors of the explaining 
variable and the vector of the parameter including the constant term, respectively.      A 
Poisson regression analysis is also conducted using the raw number of directors 
(NUMDIR), instead of BOASIZ, as the explained variable, in order to examine the 
robustness of the OLS estimations for the basic model.  OLS estimators are biased 
and inconsistent in the regression models in which non-negative count data, such as 
number of directors, are used as the dependent variable.  To deal with this problem, 
the Poisson regression model taking NUMDIR as a dependent variable assumes that: 
( β x f BOASIZ = )
[] ,.... 2 , 1 , 0 ,
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where  β λ i i x = log .    The log of the likelihood function is given by: 
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! log log β λ . 
A consistent and effective maximum-likelihood estimator can be obtained by 
maximizing this expression with respect to β.
25 
We estimate eight models to examine the impacts of the governance variables on 
board size as well as another additional eight models, in which the governance 
variables are fixed to those of the basic model, to test the effects of the 
business-activity variables.  We use White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent standard 
errors in case that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected at the 5% level by 
a Breush-Pagan test, whereas the Poisson regression model analyses always used 
robust standard errors.    The estimation results are summarized in Table 7.
26 
Panel (a) of Table 7 demonstrates that the governance variables that have a 
significant impact on board size in accordance with the theoretical hypothesis at the 
10% or higher significance level are observed only in the ownership share of outsider 
                                                        
25  For more details, see Greene (2003, pp. 740-744) and Wooldridge (2002, pp. 646-656). 
26 The correlation coefficients between independent variables are far below the 0.70 
threshold for possible multicollinearity in all combinations (Lind, Marchal, and Wathen, 
2004, p.487).  Moreover, the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for individual 
independent variables in relation to BOASIZ, except for the squares of the ownership 
variables, are much smaller than a threshold of 10.0. 
  22shareholders, the corporate establishment resulting from the privatization of a 
state-owned enterprise, as well as in company size measured by the total number of 
employees.  In contrast to privatized firms, enterprises spun off from state-owned 
enterprises or from privatized firms show no statistically significant difference in their 
average board size from that of private firms newly established during the transition 
period.  In addition, although the estimation results are not presented here, the 
squared OWNOUT is not significant; thus, its non-linear effects are not found.    On the 
other hand, the ownership by executive directors, OWNMAN, is positive, and its 
squared value is negative, contrary to the hypothesis.  In addition, both of these 
variables are statistically quite significant.    These estimation results will be examined 
again, and we will report the results of the empirical analysis on the proportion of 
outsider directors.  However, due to data constraints, it is impossible to separate the 
effects of ownership by outsider directors from those by all directors.  OWNDIR, 
which is estimated as a reference for comparison with the effects of managerial 
ownership, shows similar results to OWNMAN.    As for a board chairman, the effect of 
his/her ownership could be investigated in two ways depending on how his/her 
appointment is considered on the basis of the intercept variable between his/her 
ownership share and OUTCHA.    The results show that the impact of ownership by an 
outsider chairman is positive on board size, as we predicted, although its statistical 
significance fell short of the 10% level. 
GROFIR, a dummy variable for affiliation with a business group, is significant 
at the 5% level for model (D) through model (H), not controlling for the ownership 
share of outside shareholders.    Nevertheless, it is difficult to evaluate these results, as 
they may reflect the influence of ownership by the business group as a major 
shareholder rather than that of business integration.  Appointment of a new top 
manager, top manager of retirement age, upper limit on ownership, and legal form of 
incorporation do not affect board size.    Surprisingly, our estimation results imply that 
firms with a collective executive organ have, on average, more directors than those 
without one.    However, COLEXE is far from statistically robust. 
Panel (b) of Table 7 shows the estimation results regarding the impacts of the 
business-activity variables.  Outside financing through stock listing or bond issuance 
has the impact of enlarging board size, as does having a business diversification 
strategy.  This means that, in Russia, the linkage between corporate management and 
the capital market tends to increase board function, even if outside financing may be 
substitute for the corporate board to enhance managerial discipline.  The use and 
average length of bank credits and proportion of overdue accounts payable give debtor 
companies the incentive to increase the number of directors.  Business 
internationalization has a non-linear impact on board size in Russian firms.  This is 
consistent with Li (1994) regarding firms in developed countries.  Namely, an 
increase in foreign business activity has a negative impact on board size for firms 
selling 50% or less of their production abroad, but it reveals a positive impact for firms 
selling more than 50% of their production in foreign markets.  Both market 
competitiveness and R&D/innovation activities are neutral on board size.  Past 
financial performance has no significant impact on board size, which is in agreement 
  23with earlier studies by Yermack (1996) and others.  Meanwhile, the results of the 
estimation of Model (P) suggest that the effects of business-activity variables are 
robust when some that do not have an extremely high correlation efficient are 
concurrently built into the regression model. 
Consistently with our predictions, the endogenous variables of both SHAOUT 
and OUTCHA are positive, although they do not even reach the 10% significance level.   
The problem of whether the same results can be obtained after taking into 
consideration possible endogenous biases still remains.    We will return to this issue in 
Section 5. 
4.2.2. Proportion of outsider directors 
Next, we will analyze the determinants of the extent of outsider directorship, a board 
component most closely related with the functions and monitoring strength of 
corporate boards.  Column (b) of Table 6 shows the correlation coefficients between 
SHAOUT and a series of independent variables.  Table 8 indicates the results from a 
comparative analysis between two sample groups, i.e., a group of companies with a 
corporate board in which the majority of its directors are not outsiders 
(SHAOUT<0.50) and a group of companies with a corporate board dominated by 
outsider directors (0.50≤SHAOUT), in terms of the differences in the mean and median 
values of each of the variables, including BOASIZ and OUTCHA.    According to these 
results, all bargaining variables are significantly correlated with the proportion of 
outsider directors, which is consistent with the theoretical hypothesis.  Regarding the 
agency variables, a corporate charter’s maximum ownership restriction has the effect 
of supporting our prediction.  The results of this analysis also suggest that the more 
employees a company has, the more outsider directors it appoints. 
Many business-activity variables are also significantly associated with the 
proportion of outsider directors.  Our univariate analyses suggest that business 
diversification and outside financing from capital markets provide Russian enterprises 
with the incentive to increase the number of outsider directors.    On the other hand, the 
statistical significance of the correlation coefficients for the variables representing the 
frequency of dividend payments and the intensity of R&D/innovation activity and that 
of the differences in the mean and median values of DIVPAY and NEWPRO between 
sub-samples are small, although they are consistent with our prediction.  The 
remaining variables, including NONCOM, are significantly linked with SHAOUT, as 
well as with BOASIZ and OUTCHA, consistently with the theoretical hypothesis. 
Authur (2001), Prevost, Rao, and Hossain (2002), and many others have pointed 
out that the relative position of outsider directors in a corporate board is non-linearly 
correlated with ownership by outside investors and corporate officers.    In order to test 
the possibility of this relationship, analyses of variance were performed using the six 
ownership variables classified according to the proportion of outsider directors.  
Table 9 shows the results.  This table suggests a non-monotonic association between 
the proportion of outsider directors and stock ownership by corporate officers and 
directors, although the association is less obvious.  However, the results of the 
Scheffe multiple comparison test using 10 sample groups divided according to the 
  24proportion of outsider directors indicate that the differences in the means between 
these individual sub-groups are not statistically significant in most cases.  There may 
be a considerably higher level of variance within each sub-group due to the influence 
of other factors.  Therefore, the above points also need to be tested using a 
multivariate analysis technique with due consideration given to the impact of the 
ownership variables on the outsider director appointment process. 
Here, the regression analysis is designed to estimate a model expressed 
as () β x g SHAOUT = , the proportion of outsider directors from among all directors 
being the explained variable (SHAOUT).  To check the robustness of the estimation 
results, we also estimate alternative regression models, which take NUMOUT, 
representing the absolute number of outsider directors, or OUTDOM, a qualitative 
variable with a value of 1 assigned to companies with outsider-dominated corporate 
boards, as dependent variables. 
As shown in Figure 3, SHAOUT is far from the normal distribution 
(Shapiro-Wilk W=0.974, z=6.111, p=0.000). In addition, 245 (33.6%) of the 730 
sample firms have either a lower threshold of 0.0 or an upper threshold of 1.0.  OLS 
estimators of a regression model with such an independent variable may become 
inconsistent.  To avoid this problem, we utilize a Tobit model instead of OLS.  As 
for models using NUMOUT and OUTDOM as the explained variables, we use the 
aforementioned Poisson model and a Logit model, respectively.  The log likelihood 
function for the Tobit model taking SHAOUT as a dependent variable with both upper 
and lower thresholds is: 

































































where  (.) stands for the standard normal distribution function.    On the other hand, 
the log of the likelihood function for the Logit model assuming 
Φ
( ) β
β β x e e
x x Λ = + = = ) 1 ( ] 1 Pr[OUTDOM is given by: 
( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) [ ] ∑ ∑ Λ − ∗ − + Λ ∗ = β β i i i i x OUTDOM x OUTDOM L 1 log 1 log log , 
where  (.) denotes the logistic cumulative distribution function.  Λ
The estimation results are shown in Table 10.  All the bargaining variables 
take signs that are consistent with our assumptions, and most of them have a high level 
of statistical significance.  Moreover, the signs of the squared ownership variables, 
such as OWNOUT,
2 are opposite to those of their direct figures.    Hence, ownership by 
outside investors or corporate executives is highly likely to be non-linearly correlated 
with the appointment of outsider directors. 
Figure 5 simulates the form and degree of the impacts of ownership variables 
on outsider director appointments by the type of shareholder based on their marginal 
effects ( ( ) x x SHAOUT E ∂ ∂ ) obtained from the Tobit regression analyses.  Basically, 
the bargaining power of outside investors and an outsider chairman, both of which are 
  25represented by their ownership shares, positively affect the presence of outsider 
directors in corporate boards.    However, ownership by an outsider chairman involves 
very strong entrenchment effects.  The outsider directorship enhancement effect 
derived from shareholding by an outside chairman starts to diminish when his/her 
ownership exceeds 45%, and the entrenchment effects overwhelm the convergence 
effects when his/her ownership is more than 90%.
27  The impact of ownership by 
outside investors also has an inverted U-shaped form, but it does not affect the extent 
of outsider directorship negatively on any level of shareholding.  In contrast, 
executive officers always use their bargaining power to restrain the appointment of 
outsider directors.  A management group must have more than 56% ownership and a 
top manager, more than 70% ownership in order for the negative impact of their 
ownership to start to decrease because the marginal convergence effect of such 
managerial ownership, which increases in proportion to its fraction, is greater than its 
marginal entrenchment effect, which decreases in proportion to its fraction.   
Furthermore, regardless of their level of ownership, managerial shareholders are 
always reluctant to appoint outsider directors.    Figure 5 reveals how cautious they are 
about inviting directors from the outside.  Returning to the results of the analysis of 
the determinants of board size mentioned in Subsection 4.2.1, it is unexpectedly found 
that ownership by corporate officers was positively correlated with the number of 
directors.
28  Considering this point, as well as the negative effect of shareholding by 
senior managers on outsider director appointment, we presume that typical Russian 
corporate managers attempt to counter the pressures from outside investors by securing 
a sufficient number of insider directors in comparison with outsiders rather than by 
eliminating outsiders from their boards. 
Meanwhile, the remarkable differences in statistical significance between 
GROCOR and GROAFF  demonstrate a stark gap between core firms of business 
groups and their affiliates in terms of the organizational philosophy of the groups.  
Again, it is reasonable to assume that, in Russia, director exchanges within a business 
group are usually one-way from its core company to its affiliated member firms, and 
that, therefore, not much emphasis is placed on the opinions of the managers of such 
controlled firms in the strategic decision-making process of the business group.    Even 
though this working hypothesis needs to be empirically verified, it provides an 
important clue to the understanding of the ongoing dynamic trend of business 
integration in the Russian economy.  In addition, the effectiveness of the bargaining 
model in Russia is suggested by the significant positive correlations of NEWCEO with 
the proportion of outsider directors as well as by the strong explanatory power of the 
                                                        
27 Interestingly, similar simulation results were also obtained when the board chairmen 
coming from business groups to which the individual surveyed firms belonged or from 
their closely affiliated business partners were categorized as outside chairmen.  It is 
noteworthy, however, that this method amplifies the inverted U-shaped effect of 
ownership by a board chairman. 
28 The estimated OWNCEO values in Model (D) of Table 7(a) are significant at the 10% 
level (one-sided t=1.312, p=0.097) if top manager’s ownership is positively correlated 
with the number of directors. 
  26ownership variables and their high levels of statistical significance. 
In contrast to the bargaining variables, LIMOWN, a variable capturing the 
companies that impose upper limits on shareholding percentages by their corporate 
charters, is the only agency variable having a significant and robust impact on the 
appointment of outsider directors.  In other words, both CEOAGE and COMSIZ lose 
their effect when managerial ownership is controlled.  Contrary to the theoretical 
hypothesis, COLEXE is negatively associated with percentage of outsider directors, but 
at a low level of significance.    Political paths affecting company start-ups also reveal 
a neutral impact on the appointment of outsider directors. 
Among the business-activity variables, R&D/innovation activity, past financial 
performance, and debts are consistent with our theoretical predictions and statistically 
robust.  ROAAVE and the two other financial performance variables, as well as 
BANCRE and ARREAR, have considerable impact on the balance of the bargaining 
power between managers and their opponents, suggesting the effectiveness of the 
bargaining model as an analytical tool for understanding corporate governance issues 
in Russia.    BUSLIN and MARFIN are positive but insignificant, which means that it is 
almost statistically random whether it is an insider or an outsider who is going to 
become a new director to carry out outside fundraising or business diversification 
activities in Russia with an underdeveloped market of human resources. 
The endogenous variable BOASIZ was considerably significant in the Poisson 
regression model (B) but fell short of the 10% significance level in the other models.  
On the other hand, OUTCHA was positive and significant at the 1% level in all models, 
which is consistent with the simulation results shown in Figure 5. 
4.2.3. Board chairman appointment 
Lastly, we deal with the appointment of the board chairmen.  Looking at the 
correlation coefficients in Column (C) of Table 7 and the comparison in Table 11 
between the sample firms with board chairmen who are promoted from the inside and 
the samples with outsider board chairmen, it is clear that only a few of the variables are 
significantly linked with differences in their appointment routes.  Namely, the four 
variables of SHAOUT,  MANSHA,  CEOAGE, and LIMOWN are supportive of our 
hypothesis in a statistically significant fashion.  On the other hand, none of the 
business-activity variables is found to be significantly correlated with the chairman 
appointment routes, which is also consistent with our prediction. 
The Logit analysis of the regression model ( ) β x h OUTCHA= , which takes the 
probability of the appointment of outside chairmen as the explained variable, also 
supports the results of univariate analyses (Table 12).    In other words, the presence of 
outsider directors has a considerable impact on increasing the chances of board 
chairmen being appointed from within the group.  In contrast, soon-to-be-retired top 
managers are strongly opposed to the board chairmanship being taken over by an 
outsider director in an attempt to retain their influence after their retirement or to hand 
over their managerial power to their loyal followers.  It is also confirmed that 
OWNCEO and OWNMAN  are negatively and significantly correlated with the 
probability of appointment of an outsider chairman, although MANSHA is not 
  27significant in the regression models.  Meanwhile, although the details are not 
presented here, it was verified that OWNCEO is the only ownership variable with a 
non-linear impact on the probability of appointment of an outside chairman. 
Contrary to our prediction, OWNOUT is negative and insignificant for Models 
(A) through (C).    These results are possibly associated with the fact that this variable 
partly covers the shareholding by business groups as major owners, as indicated by the 
negative significance of the variables related with business integration.    Therefore, we 
estimated a model taking NONGRO, a new explaining variable with 1 assigned to 
independent companies, instead of GROFIR, and its intercept variable with OWNOUT.  
The estimation results of Model (D) indicate that the effect of ownership by outside 
investors on the appointment of an outsider chairman is exactly the opposite in 
group-affiliated firms and independent firms.  These findings suggest that business 
groups are reluctant to have the board chairmen of their affiliates appointed from 
among persons other than the managers or other insiders of those affiliates.  
Unfortunately, it is impossible to ascertain whether this is due to an opportunistic 
collusion within each business group or to the intent of each group to increase its 
monitoring efforts.  Further study needs to be conducted to explore the ambivalent 
organizational relationship between business groups and their member firms. 
The results of our empirical analyses presented in this subsection reveal that the 
appointment of a chairman, the key person on corporate boards, is decisively 
dependent on the power balance between managers and their opposing parties, 
providing evidence for the relatively high effectiveness of the bargaining model 
developed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) through comparisons with empirical 
studies on the determinants of board size and the proportion of outsider directors. 
 
5. Endogeneity of Board Formation and Robustness of Estimation Results 
Before summarizing the findings of this study, we address two issues that must be 
examined from an econometric point of view.  One is the possibility of endogeneity 
among three board components, and the other is the overall statistical robustness of the 
estimation results obtained from various regression analyses. 
5.1. Endogeneity of board formation 
Although we assume that there is an endogenous relationship among board size, the 
proportion of outsider directors, and the possibility of the appointment of an outsider 
chairman, the regression analyses conducted in the previous section did not give any 
special consideration to the possible simultaneous-equation bias behind this 
relationship.    This kind of bias may distort the estimation results that would lead to a 
false conclusion.    Hence, we need to verify the existence of any influence. 
A simultaneous-equation bias can be handled by using the method of 
instrumental variables (IV) or the simultaneous-equations model method.  The IV 
method, however, involves the difficulty of eliminating the arbitrariness of the 
instrumental variables that have been selected by the analyst.  This problem is rather 
serious in performing an empirical analysis of a corporate governance model, as its 
estimation results are greatly affected by the choice of the instrumental variables due to 
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applicable throughout the world beyond the boundaries of nation states and legal 
systems (Whidebee, 1997; Hossain, Prevost, and Rao, 2001).  Furthermore, when 
using the IV method for an analysis, as in this paper, in which several variables are, in 
turn, assigned to several regression models as endogenous variables, the analyst must 
select a considerable number of instrumental variables.  In a practical sense, this is a 
very difficult procedure. 
In view of the above situation, we utilize the simultaneous-equations model to 
treat simultaneous-equation biases.    However, this method may unexpectedly provide 
false results due to a small but grave error in the model specification affecting the 
system as a whole.  As long as the true structure of a given corporate governance 
model is unknown, it is rather risky to randomly select the independent variables to be 
evaluated (Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998).  Against this background, we adopt, as 
the second-best method of model specification, the following models, using the three 
endogenous variables and the 18 independent variables whose coefficients were found 
to be comparatively robust at higher than the 10% significance level, as revealed by the 
regression analyses in the previous section as well as industry dummy variables 
(INDDUMs).    The results are shown below: 
, , , , , , , ( MARFIN BUSLIN COMSIZ PRICOM OWNOUT OUTCHA SHAOUT f BOASIZ =  
) , , ,
2 INDDUMs EXPSHA EXPSHA BANCRE , 
, , , , , , (
2 GROFIR MANSHA OWNOUT OWNOUT OUTCHA BOASIZ g SHAOUT =  
, , , , , , ROAAVE NEWPRO COMSIZ LIMOWN CEOAGE NEWCEO  
) ,INDDUMs BANCRE , 
, , , , , ( NONGRO OWNOUT NONGRO OWNOUT SHAOUT BOASIZ h OUTCHA × =  
) , , INDDUMs PRICOM CEOAGE . 
We estimate this system by a three-stage least squares (3SLS) model.   
Estimations are conducted both for the case in which the independent variables are 
limited to the governance variables and for the case in which the business-activity 
variables are also included in the independent variables. 
Table 12 shows the results.  We confirm that the explanatory power and 
statistical significance of the individual independent variables are not so severely 
affected as to require that the primary analysis results in the previous section be 
reviewed even if these simultaneous-equations models are used to deal with the 
endogeneity of board components.    Nevertheless, PRICOM, a dummy for the political 
background behind the corporate establishment, and COMSIZ, a proxy of company 
size, considerably lose their significance in the regression models in which SHAOUT 
or OUTCHA is used as the dependent variable.  We also find that the significance of 
both NEWCEO and CEOAGE, which express the attributes of top managers, decreases 
to the 10% level when the business-activity variables are introduced.   The estimation 
results of the endogenous variables showed no difference from those in Tables 10 and 
12, indicating that SHAOUT and OUTCHA have a positive and significant impact on 
each other. 
A Hausman specification test indicates that it is better to choose a 3SLS 
  29approach rather than an OLS technique for models that use the proportion of outsider 
directors as the explained variable if the explained variable consists of governance 
variables and for models of board size if the business-activity variables are added.  
The Hausman test also suggests that there are no comparatively and statistically 
significant advantages and disadvantages between 2SLS and 3SLS models.  In fact, 
no distinctive differences have been identified between these two methods regarding 
the estimation results.    We also attempted an IV estimation, only to find that its results 
were consistent with those indicated in Table 13.    As already explained, however, the 
IV estimation is quite sensitive to the choice of instrumental variables, as Barnhart and 
Rosenstein (1998) and other earlier studies have pointed out. 
5.2. Robustness of the estimation results 
The last issue to be examined is the overall robustness of the estimation results, 
including those by the 3SLS model.  To this end, we conducted supplementary 
analyses of the individual regression models placed under various sample restrictions 
and confirmed that these restrictions had no grave impact on the findings presented in 
this paper.  Specifically, supplementary regression analyses were performed in the 
following five different settings: (a) when the samples are limited to industrial firms; 
(b) when the enterprises involved in fuel/energy, metallurgy, and communication 
sectors and subject to unique state restrictions concerning firm organization and 
business activities are excluded from the observations; (c) when the samples are 
limited to those whose company size is within the mean ±1 standard deviation of all 
surveyed firms to exclude very large enterprises from the observations; (e) when the 
samples are limited to those yet to issue their securities; and (f) when the samples are 
limited to non-group-affiliated firms.  Moreover, no distinctive differences are 
observed in the estimation results even after replacing ROAAVE and PROAVE, the 
industry-adjusted variables of past financial performance, which represent the simple 
difference between the actual value and the mean value for each industry 
(i.e., ), except that the significance levels for some of the models 
decrease slightly. 
e Performanc ∆
Furthermore, we re-estimated the models using alternative estimation methods 
including a generalized least squares (GLS) method, a Probit model, an ordered 
Logit/Probit model, a truncated regression model, and the Heckman’s two-step 
estimation method,
29 and the results showed no obvious differences from those of the 
original analyses.  On the basis of these results, we can safely say that the results of 
the quantitative analyses in this paper are statistically robust in the above sense. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we studied the board structure of joint-stock companies in Russia and its 
                                                        
29 The Heckman’s two-step estimation method deals with the possible bias that may arise 
in the Tobit model when the coefficients for the explaining variables for the existence of 
an outsider director are different from the coefficients for the explaining variables for 
the proportion of outsider directors. 
  30determinants using the results of a Japan-Russia joint enterprise survey conducted 
across the country in the first half of 2005.  The findings strongly suggest that the 
long years of study by many researchers in the fields of organizational economics and 
corporate finance in industrialized countries are quite effective for analyzing the 
industrial economy and firm organizations in Russia, a state which is still in transition 
to a market economy even after over a dozen years of the collapse of the Soviet Union.   
To be more specific, the theories and empirical methods of financial and organizational 
economics help accurately pinpoint the determinants of board size, proportion of 
outsider directors, and probability of the appointment of an outside chairman in 
Russian corporations.  Conversely, it can be said that corporate managers and 
investors in modern Russia organize their monitoring and supervisory systems in 
accordance with the economic and organizational logics applied to mature capitalist 
economies.  The long-standing and difficult attempt to shift to a market economy in 
Russia is now starting to bear fruit. 
Meanwhile, an important finding in this paper is that, if it is more reasonable to 
interpret the board compositions of listed companies in developed countries by the 
classical agency theory that implicitly assumes the self-organizing nature of a 
well-balanced corporate governance system, it is also more reasonable to interpret the 
board formation in Russian enterprises by the bargaining hypothesis of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1998), supposing that board compositions are simultaneously and 
endogenously determined through the bargaining process between CEO and directors.  
This is supported by the fact that the bargaining variables of Russian enterprises, such 
as those for the ownership shares of management executives, outside investors, and 
outsider directors, as well as the tenure of the top manager, have very distinctive 
explanatory power pertaining to the determination of their board formation process, 
strongly suggesting that, in Russia, boards of directors are possibly a site for struggle 
for hegemony over corporate management among managers, outside investors, and 
their board representatives, who seek to maximize their power and benefits. 
As described in Section 3, the corporate board in a typical Russian joint-stock 
company is not dominated by insiders and can be characterized as a managerial 
supervising organ with an appropriate level of openness and a balanced membership 
between executive officers and outsider directors.  In fact, however, as shown in 
Figure 3, the number of Russian firms with statistically average corporate boards is 
much smaller than the number of companies whose boards have an extremely high 
proportion of outsider directors or, conversely, are overwhelmed by managerial 
directors.  This polarization in board composition is a conspicuous feature in Russia 
but not in developed countries.    If managers and their opponents fiercely compete for 
hegemony on the corporate board, the differences in their bargaining power, however 
small, are highly likely to result in a very unbalanced board structure, probably due to 
the rule of majority voting.    It is indeed probable that this phenomenon is widespread 
in Russia. 
The hegemony-oriented corporate model is intuitively consistent with our 
understanding of the modern Russian economy.  Even today, several years since 
Vladimir Putin took the oath of presidency under the banner of “rule of law,” Russia 
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awareness of Russian people of the importance of contracts and property rights and the 
business ethics of Russian managers are improving but still remain poor.  In this 
social environment, it is no wonder that investors do not expect much from other 
owners and creditors concerning their managerial discipline and choose to directly 
monitor corporate managers using all channels available in an attempt to maximize 
their interests.  In response, corporate managers always behave opportunistically by 
being on the alert against those hostile investors.  It is true that such a deep-seated 
mutual distrust serves as a mechanism to make business enterprises functional.  
However, engaging in a heated battle for hegemony over the board of directors tends to 
be excessively time- and energy-consuming, contrary to the case of a society, which is 
capable to achieve effective managerial discipline by harmoniously and autonomously 
organizing different corporate governance mechanisms.  In this sense, the 
distinctively high applicability of bargaining models to Russian firms reflects the 
immaturity of the Russian socio-economic system. 
Furthermore, this study demonstrated that the Russia’s legal system and its 
peculiarities as a transition economy have a great deal of influence in determining the 
board compositions.  The political backgrounds of start-ups, as well as several rules 
set by the corporate law and the CG Code, have statistically significant impacts on the 
decision-making process of Russian firms.  On the other hand, the federal 
administrative directives that have been issued to encourage companies to add more 
independent directors and the provisions of the Law on JSCs preventing corporate 
managers from concurrently holding the post of board chairman have not yet produced 
the desired outcome, partly because they are not sufficiently enforced and partly 
because of their institutional flaws.    Until a certain level of mutual trust is established 
among Russian citizens, increased state regulations on the compositions and functions 
of corporate boards and other statutory corporate organs may be effective for 
alleviating the aforementioned problems.  From this standpoint, and in many other 
respects, it is to be hoped that the legal and institutional framework of Russian 
joint-stock companies will become more sophisticated. 
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Board size 6.64 2.40 7 3 23 5 7
Insider directors 3.22 2.43 3 0 21 1 5
Managers 2.90 2.21 3 0 15 1 5
Representatives of employees and labor unions 0.32 1.15 0 0 21 0 0
Outsider directors 3.42 2.94 3 0 17 1 5
Representatives of non-employee private shareholders 2.55 2.59 2 0 17 0 4
Independent directors 0.43 1.13 0 0 10 0 0
Representatives of federal government agencies 0.18 0.77 00800
Representatives of local governments 0.21 0.75 00600
Source: The joint enterprise survey.Table 2. International comparison of board size and proportion of outsider director
Mean S. D. Median Mean S. D. Median
North America
U.S. IPO firms 
a 1978-87 1,116 6.07 1.87 6  
U.S. listed firms 
b 1984-91 452 12.25 0.43 12   54  19  56  
U.S. listed firms
 c 1989-95 508 11.88 2.95 12  55.3 17.1 56.2
U.S. large industrial firms
 d 1999 100 11.79 2.94 12  71.8 12.1 73.0
U.S. large commercial banks
 d 1999 100 16.37 5.01 16  81.3 6.9 83.1
U.S. large public firms
 d 1999 100 11.46 2.74 11  80.5 11.7 83.3
Canadian listed firms
 e 1996 79 12.34 12  74   79  
Canadian public firms
 f 2000 38 10.81 3.07 11  89.4 10.6 90.0
Europe
U.K. listed firms
 g 1993-96 1,271 8.01 2.64 8  42.7 14.4 42.9
U.K. listed firms
 h 1994 250 8.07 2.84 8  39  
U.K. listed firms
 e 1996 66 12.03 12  48   50  
French IPO firms
 i 1993-99 299 5.30 2.32 5  53.1
French listed firms
 e 1996 42 12.93 13  81   82  
German listed firms 
e 1996 33 15.06 16  60   58  
Italian listed firms
 e 1996 56 9.23 9  74   81  
Spanish listed firms 
e 1996 28 12.29 11  75   80  
Swiss listed firms
 e 1996 17 9.12 9  90   90  
Swiss listed firms
 j 1 2001 165 6.59 2.33 6   87  15  89  
Dutch listed firms
 e 1996 37 6.84 7  
Dutch listed firms
 k 1996 94 4.95 1.83 5  84.3 19.9 100  
Belgian listed firms
 e 1996 12 13.17 11.5 76  81  
Swedish listed firms
 l 1996-98 98 8.18 2.01 84  13  
Finish small and medium-scale firms
 m1992-94 879 3.71 1.52 3  
Russian joint-stock companies
 n 2005 730 6.64 2.40 7  48.9 35.3 55.6
Asia-Pacific
Japanese listed firms
 o 1990-2001 1,280 13.97 6.55 13  20.0 19.7 14.3
Chinese listed firms
 p 1996 530 9.8 41  
Taiwanese listed firms
 q 1998 251 8.19 4.18 7  
Korean listed firms
 r 1990-99 199 10.51 8.36
Australian listed firms 
s 2 1989 135 5.56 2.03 5   62  27  67  
Singapore listed firms 
t 1995 147 8.04 2.08 8   57  21  57  
New Zealand listed firms 
u 1991-95 63-105 6.60 2.15 6  55.7 25.7 60.0
2 The proportion of outsider directors covers only independent directors
Source: a: Baker and Gompers (2003); b: Yermack (1996); c: Fich and Shivdasani (2006); d: Booth, Cornett, and Tehraian (2002); e:
de Andres, Azofa, and Lopez (2005); f: Bozec (2005); g: Peasnell, Pope, and Young (2005); h: Vafeas and Theodorov (1998); i:
Roosenboom (2005); j: Beiner et al. (2004); k: van Ees, Postma, and Sterken (2003); l: Randøy and Jenssen (2004); m: Eisenberg,
Sundgren, and Wells (1998); n: This study; o:Abe (2003); p: Peng (2004); q: Yeh and Woidtke (2005); r: Kim (2005); s: Arthur (2001);
t: Mak and Li (2001); u: Prevost, Rao, and Hossain (2002).
Notes: 
1 Board of auditors.
Board size
Proportion of
outsider directors (%) Analysis
period
Sample
size  Source: The joint enterprise survey.
  Source: The joint enterprise survey.
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Source: The joint enterprise survey.Table 3.  Correlation matrix of board components
Board size (no. of directors) 1.0000









1 Continuous variable with 0.00 ≤x≤1.00.
2 A dummy variable with a value of 1 assigned to firms with an outsider chairman
3 Figures in parentheses are  p-values.  ***: significant at the 1% level
Source: Author's calculation based on the joint enterprise survey.
Table 4.  Industry-to-industry comparison of board composition
Industrial sector 6.59 0.47 0.31
Fuel and energy 7.62 0.70 0.28
Metallurgy 7.12 0.53 0.18
Machine-building and metal working  6.93 0.49 0.32
Chemical and petrochemical 6.61 0.58 0.41
Wood, paper, and wood products 6.25 0.47 0.24
Light industry 6.71 0.36 0.33
Food industry 5.64 0.45 0.34
Construction materials 6.50 0.28 0.25
Communications sector 7.43 0.66 0.34
Comparison between the industrial and
communications sectors








2 test on the equality of proportions - - 0.289











2  ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% leve










1 The Welch test was performed when the null hypothesis that two samples have the same


















Ownership share of large outsider shareholders/squared term +/- +/- +/-
Ownership share of top manager/squared term -/+ -/+ -/+
Ownership share of management group/squared term -/+ -/+ -/+
Ownership share of outsider directors/squared term +/- +/- +/-
Affiliation with a business group ++?
New appointment of top manager +++
Agency variables
Soon-to-retire top manager (-) - -
Establishment as an open joint-stock company as the corporate form ---
Restrictions  on ownership shares and voting rights by the articles of incorporation ---
Adoption of a collective executive organ (-) (+) (+)
Inherited state assets +++
Company size +??
Business-activity variables
Business diversification + ? (+)
Financing from capital markets ???
Competitions in product markets - - (-)
R&D/innovation strategy - - (-)
Poor financial performance (+) + (+)
Debts + + (+)
Business internationalization/squired term -/+ -/+ (-)/(+)
Endogenous variables
Board size + (+)
Proportion of outsider directors ++
Appointment of an outsider chairman (+) +
Table 5.  Theoretical predictions of the impacts of firm organization and business activities on board composition
Note: '+' stands for a positive correlation, '-,' for a negative correlation, '(+),' for a positive but statistically weak correlation, and '(-),' for a negative but
statistically weak correlation, and '?' indicates that the effect is unpredictable.
Type of board componentMean S. D. Median Min. Max.
Bargaining variables (BARVARs)
Ownership share of outsider shareholders (OWNOUT)
 3, 4 1.87 2.14 0 0 5 0.238
*** 0.412
*** 0.020








Ownership share of management group (OWNMAN) (膓) 15.93 21.94 4.22 0.00 100.00 -0.193
*** -0.338
*** -0.073
Ownership share of directors' group (OWNDIR) (膓) 14.72 21.02 3.42 0.00 100.00 -0.203
*** -0.332
*** -0.071
Ownership share of a board chairman (OWNCHA) (膓) 3.34 9.64 0.00 0.00 90.10 -0.167
*** -0.102
** -0.011




Core business group member dummy (GROCOR) 0.05 0.23 0 0 1 0.038 0.013 0.030




Dummy for newly appointed top manager (NEWCEO)




Dummy for firms with top manager of retirement age (CEOAGE)
 6 0.10 0.30 0 0 1 0.038 0.016 -0.099
***
Open joint-stock company dummy (OPECOM) 0.68 0.47 1 0 1 -0.063
* 0.021 0.052




Dummy for firms with a collective executive organ (COLEXE) 0.34 0.47 0 0 1 0.203
*** 0.079
** 0.016
Dummy for former state-owned or ex-municipal privatized companies (PRICOM) 0.69 0.46 1 0 1 0.117
*** -0.045 -0.051
Dummy for firms separated from state-owned or privatized enterprises (SPIOFF) 0.10 0.29 0 0 1 -0.037 -0.001 -0.046
Total number of employees (COMSIZ)





















with board componentsBusiness-activity variables (BUSVARs)
Number of business lines (BUSLIN)
 7 2.15 2.05 1 1 12 0.210
*** 0.165
*** 0.005
Dummy for firms which issued shares or bonds on capital markets (MARFIN) 0.13 0.34 0 0 1 0.351
*** 0.281
*** -0.036
Dummy for non-competing firms in product markets (NONCOM)
 8 0.08 0.27 0 0 1 0.017 0.101
*** 0.019
Dummy for development of new products or services in 2001-04 (NEWPRO) 0.62 0.48 1 0 1 0.021 -0.038 -0.026
Annual average ROA in 2001-04 (ROAAVE) 
9 0.12 0.90 0.00 -8.08 4.26 -0.029 -0.114
*** -0.049
Annual average gross profit rate on sales in 2001-04 (PROAVE) 
9 4.86 19.43 0.00 -25.28 197.91 0.271
*** 0.135
*** -0.013
Frequency of dividend payments in 2001-03 (DIVPAY) 0.93 1.31 0 0 3 0.161
*** 0.017 -0.039
Firms which used bank credits and their average lending period (BANCRE)
 10 2.53 1.45 3 0 5 0.166
*** 0.093
** -0.027
Share of overdue accounts payable in total debts (ARREAR)
 11 0.92 1.44 0 0 5 0.083
** 0.103
*** 0.009
Share of exports in total sales (EXPSHA) 




1 A unit is the number of directors.  In the regression analyses, its natural logarithm is utilized
2 The definition is the same as that in Table 3
4 Excluding domestic individual shareholders
5 "New top manager" denotes a top manager (CEO, company president, or general director) appointed during the period from 2001 to 2004
6 "Top manager of retirement age" denotes a top manager aged 61 or older as of the survey date
7 Based on the OKONKh two-digit classification.
9 Industry-adjusted.
13 ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level.
12 "Share of exports in total sales" falls under one of the following 6 categories:  0: 0%; 1: 10% or less;  2: 10.1 to 25.0%; 3: 25.1 to 50.0%; 4: 50.1 to 75.0%; 5: More than 75%.
11 "Share of overdue accounts payable in total debts" falls under one of the following 6 categories: 0: 0%; 1: 5% or less;  2: 5.1 to 10.0%; 3: 10.1 to 20.0%; 4: 20.1 to 30.0%; 5: More than 30%
8 "Non-competing firms" denote the enterprises that responded that they were “not competing” with any domestic company, any domestic foreign-affiliated country, any CIS company, any company in
an industialized country, or any overseas company.
Source: The SKRIN databases were used for the ownership shares of managers and directors ( OWNCEO, OWNMAN, OWNDIR, OWNCHA ) and numbers of business lines ( BUSLIN). The SPARK's
databases were used for the annual average ROA and the annual average gross profit rate on sales ( ROAAVE, PROAVE ).  All of the other variables were created on the basis of the results of the joint
enterprise survey.
3 "Ownership share" means an ownership share rated on the following 6-point scale: 0: 0%; 1: 10.0% or less;  2: 10.1 to 25.0%; 3: 25.1 to 50.0%; 4: 50.1 to 75.0%; 5: 75.1 to100.0%.
10 "Firms which used bank credits and their average lending period" falls under one of the following 6 categories: 0: Did not use any bank credits during the period from 2001 to 2004; 1: Used bank
credits, and their average lending period was less than 3 months; 2:  Used bank credits, and their average lending period ranged from 3 months to less than 6 months; 3: Used bank credits, and their
average lending period ranged from 6 months to less than one year; 4: Used bank credits, and their average lending period ranged from one year to less than 3 years; 5:  Used bank credits, and their
average lending period was more than 3 years.Table 7.  Regression analysis of the impacts of the governance and business-activity variables on board size













(0.107) (0.121) (0.107) (0.114) (0.120) (0.118) (0.111) (0.112)
SHAOUT 0.0467 0.0339 0.0500 0.0453 0.0525 0.0528 0.0480 0.0454
(0.052) (0.057) (0.053) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047)
OUTCHA 0.0127 0.0130 0.0118 0.0454 0.0428 0.0413 0.0418 0.0360

















































NEWCEO 0.0084 0.0027 0.0101 -0.0298 -0.0291 -0.0301 -0.0218 -0.0220
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026)
CEOAGE 0.0455 0.0588 0.0464 -0.0195 -0.0173 -0.0195 -0.0080 -0.0102
(0.042) (0.050) (0.042) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.049)
OPECOM -0.0429
* -0.0333 -0.0416 -0.0285 -0.0342 -0.0365 -0.0325 -0.0339
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028)
LIMOWN -0.0288 -0.0253 -0.0265 -0.0229 -0.0303 -0.0333 -0.0255 -0.0262
(0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036)
COLEXE 0.0464
* 0.0457 0.0468
* 0.0310 0.0340 0.0312 0.0288 0.0308










(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
SPIOFF 0.0495 0.0388 0.0529 0.0407 0.0415 0.0447 0.0364 0.0355










(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Industrial dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 536 536 536 397 398 396 397 397
Adj. R
2/Pseudo R
2 0.30 0.05 0.30 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36



























































(0.050) (0.056) (0.058) (0.051) (0.051) (0.049) (0.049) (0.058)
NONCOM -0.0241 -0.0451 -0.0455 -0.0371 -0.0291 -0.0384 -0.0542 -0.0326


























1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 488 410 412 485 484 490 491 401
Adj. R





















1 Including all the independent variables used for Model (A).
Source: Author's estimation.
2 The figures in parentheses show the White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *:
BOASIZ BOASIZ BOASIZ BOASIZ BOASIZ BOASIZ BOASIZ BOASIZ
(P)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS







OWNOUT 1.11 0.00 2.69 3.00 -9.850
*** -8.971
*** -




OWNCEO 11.03 1.72 3.25 0.00 6.235
*** 6.787
*** -
OWNMAN 24.67 18.72 9.99 0.39 7.419
*** 8.206
*** -
OWNDIR 22.91 16.03 9.05 0.13 7.299
*** 8.362
*** -
OWNCHA 4.52 0.26 2.42 0.00 2.316
** 6.704
*** -




GROCOR 0.05 0.00 0.05 0.00 -0.264 -0.264 0.070
***









CEOAGE 0.09 0.00 0.12 0.00 -0.893 -0.893 0.799
OPECOM 0.66 1.00 0.68 1.00 -0.549 -0.550 0.302




COLEXE 0.32 0.00 0.36 0.00 -1.270 -1.270 1.614
PRICOM 0.71 1.00 0.70 1.00 0.459 0.459 0.211
SPIOFF 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.222 0.222 0.049




BUSLIN 1.87 1.00 2.46 1.00 -3.682
*** -3.365
*** -








NEWPRO 0.65 1.00 0.60 1.00 1.393 1.392 1.939
ROAAVE 0.20 0.23 0.06 -0.17 1.852
* 2.132
** -
PROAVE 2.43 -0.97 7.90 2.55 -3.354
*** -2.970
*** -
DIVPAY 0.92 0.00 0.97 0.00 -0.542 -0.777 -
BANCRE 2.40 3.00 2.71 3.00 -2.846
*** -3.137
*** -
ARREAR 0.79 0.00 1.06 0.00 -2.524
** -2.239
** -
EXPSHA 0.79 0.00 1.01 0.00 -2.388
** -1.309 -
Endogenous variables
BOASIZ 6.14 5.00 7.12 7.00 -5.660
*** -5.846
*** -





1 See Table 6 for the definition and descriptive statistics of variables
Source: Author's estimation.
Table 8.  Univariate comparison between firms with an insider-dominated corrporate board and firm
with an outsider-dominated corporate board










2 The Welch test was performed when the null hypothesis that two samples have the same poplation variance was rejected
by F tests for homoscedasticity.










of 0-10膓(G1) 0.55 0.77 13.40 27.47 25.96 5.01
10-20膓(G2) 1.10 0.83 9.82 22.47 21.24 2.99
20-30膓(G3) 1.55 0.79 6.49 21.19 18.06 4.97
30-40膓(G4) 2.32 0.57 15.97 28.25 27.50 4.10
40-50膓(G5) 1.73 0.61 10.54 22.04 21.06 4.93
50-60膓(G6) 2.09 0.54 7.81 19.23 16.73 2.27
60-70膓(G7) 2.33 0.41 5.03 12.12 10.16 1.85
70-80膓(G8) 2.51 0.35 3.32 13.71 13.01 3.11
80-90膓(G9) 3.01 0.19 2.63 7.11 6.95 2.05


































G1/G5 11.072 4.247 0.386 1.392 1.151 1.682
G6/G10 3.780 30.737
*** 12.488 7.792 8.996 0.450
G1/G6 16.988






G5/G6 0.629 0.568 0.073 1.592 1.282 2.526
G4/G7 0.066 1.766 3.101 4.665 5.397 10.743
G3/G8 3.793 20.133









1 See Table 6 for the definition and descriptive statistics of variables
Source: Author's estimation.
2  ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level.
























(MANSHA)Table 10.  Regression analysis of the impacts of governance and business-activity variables on the appointment of outsider direct






** 0.0382 0.2785 0.3348
* 0.3015
* 0.1833
(0.148) (0.224) (1.029) (0.128) (0.178) (0.179) (0.180) (0.182)
BOASIZ 0.0606 1.0316
*** 0.3755 0.0774 0.0599 0.0729 0.0730 0.0656
























































































*** 0.0554 0.0762 0.0770 0.0460
(0.057) (0.082) (0.336) (0.050) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
OPECOM 0.0249 0.0107 -0.0094 0.0192 0.0183 0.0263 0.0304 0.0074









(0.053) (0.104) (0.327) (0.047) (0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055)
COLEXE -0.0453 -0.0901
* -0.2924 -0.0374 -0.0397 -0.0405 -0.0433 -0.0207
(0.038) (0.054) (0.248) (0.033) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043)
PRICOM 0.0052 0.0276 0.1287 0.0133 -0.0231 -0.0356 -0.0359 -0.0458
(0.048) (0.072) (0.317) (0.042) (0.059) (0.058) (0.059) (0.060)
SPIOFF -0.0133 0.0606 0.2179 -0.0094 -0.0926 -0.0991 -0.0989 -0.1031





* 0.0225 0.0139 0.0159 0.0269
(0.017) (0.021) (0.129) (0.015) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Industrial dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 536 536 536 536 397 398 396 397
Pseudo R
2 0.34 0.29 0.32 0.42 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.23
Log likelihood -301.97 -1030.52 -251.16 -228.44 -209.45 -208.93 -209.50 -214.76





















(E) (F) (C) (B)
Poisson ML




BUSLIN 0.0039 0.0069 0.0075 0.0071 0.0067 0.0056 0.0059 0.0079
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009)
MARFIN 0.0417 0.0613 0.1038 0.0681 0.0393 0.0620 0.0543 0.0252
(0.073) (0.077) (0.079) (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.073) (0.076)
NONCOM -0.0845 -0.0835 -0.0426 -0.0519 -0.0583 -0.0566 -0.0711 -0.1451
*































 1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 488 410 412 485 484 490 491 401
Pseudo R
2 0.36 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.42
Log likelihood -267.22 -206.06 -210.17 -267.89 -263.85 -269.00 -269.49 -192.80










1 Including all the independent variables used for Model (A).
Source: Author's estimation.
Tobit ML Tobit ML
(P) (L)
2 The figures in parentheses show the standard errors (White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors for the Poisson and Logit models). ***: significant at the 1%




Tobit ML Tobit ML
SHAOUT SHAOUT SHAOUT SHAOUT SHAOUT SHAOUT SHAOUT
Tobit ML
(K) (M) (N) (O)
Tobit ML Tobit MLSource: Author's estimation.
Note: Illustrated on the basis of the marginal effects of the ownership variables that are re-estimated using the Tobit regression models (A),
(E), (F), (G), and (H) presented in Table 10.













0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Ownership share (膓)



































































OWNOUT 1.83 0.00 1.92 1.00 -0.504 -0.478 -




OWNCEO 7.53 0.10 4.59 0.02 2.101
** 1.458 -
OWNMAN 17.42 4.90 13.88 4.21 1.567 0.952 -
OWNDIR 16.22 3.91 12.90 3.33 1.524 1.068 -




GROCOR 0.05 0.00 0.07 0.00 -0.809 -0.809 0.656




NEWCEO 0.40 0.00 0.38 0.00 0.559 0.559 0.313
AGEVARs




OPECOM 0.66 1.00 0.71 1.00 -1.420 -1.419 2.016




COLEXE 0.34 0.00 0.36 0.00 -0.446 -0.446 0.199
PRICOM 0.72 1.00 0.67 1.00 1.394 1.393 1.943
SPIOFF 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 1.259 1.258 1.586
COMSIZ 2147.48 500.00 1692.10 400.00 0.980 2.003
** -
BUSVARs
BUSLIN 2.17 1.00 2.19 1.00 -0.131 -0.477 -
MARFIN 0.15 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.977 0.977 0.956
NEWPRO 0.64 1.00 0.61 1.00 0.711 0.711 0.506
ROAAVE 0.13 -0.02 0.04 -0.09 1.170 0.478 -
PROAVE 5.29 0.33 4.72 -0.92 0.318 0.658 -
DIVPAY 1.00 0.00 0.89 0.00 1.039 0.817 -
BANCRE 2.59 3.00 2.50 3.00 0.721 1.120 -
ARREAR 0.91 0.00 0.94 0.00 -0.242 -0.254 -
EXPSHA 0.93 0.00 0.75 0.00 1.889
* 1.537 -
Endogenous variables
BOASIZ 6.74 7.00 6.52 7.00 1.130 0.633 -




1 See Table 6 for the definition and descriptive statistics of variables
Source: Author's estimation.
Table 11. Univariate comparisons between firms with an insider board chairman and firms with a
outsider board chairman
3  ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level.
2 The Welch test was performed when the null hypothesis that two samples have the same population variance was
rejected by F tests for homoscedasticity.
Variable name
 1




















Const. 0.2674 0.2632 0.2454 -0.8452 -1.1694 -0.9225 -1.1661 -1.0604
(0.960) (0.961) (0.961) (1.030) (1.270) (1.282) (1.276) (1.276)
BOASIZ 0.2474 0.2474 0.2398 0.2303 0.6878 0.7694
* 0.7250 0.6917










(0.407) (0.408) (0.409) (0.393) (0.475) (0.479) (0.478) (0.479)
OWNOUT -0.0597 -0.0858 -0.0591 -0.2913
***




MANSHA 0.0825 0.0855 0.0740 0.0360



































NEWCEO -0.3522 -0.3506 -0.3402 -0.3200 -0.2798 -0.3134 -0.2004 -0.1728










(0.410) (0.409) (0.410) (0.409) (0.418) (0.420) (0.430) (0.431)
OPECOM 0.1241 0.1279 0.1325 0.1819 0.1287 0.1164 0.1661 0.1513
(0.230) (0.234) (0.231) (0.234) (0.283) (0.287) (0.288) (0.287)
LIMOWN -0.1723 -0.1627 -0.1611 -0.2361 -0.4948 -0.5459 -0.5228 -0.4790




* 0.3823 0.2424 0.2407 0.2500 0.2242





** -0.4969 -0.5089 -0.6267 -0.5449
(0.286) (0.286) (0.286) (0.294) (0.400) (0.403) (0.394) (0.401)
SPIOFF -0.5375 -0.5385 -0.5240 -0.6372 -0.4396 -0.5319 -0.4822 -0.4273




* -0.1768 -0.1834 -0.2165
* -0.1923 -0.2020
(0.112) (0.112) (0.112) (0.117) (0.125) (0.126) (0.125) (0.126)
Industrial dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 536 536 536 536 397 397 398 396
Pseudo R
2 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.12














Logit ML Logit ML Logit ML
(B)
Logit ML Logit ML
OUTCHA OUTCHA
Logit ML Logit ML Logit ML











BUSLIN 0.0641 0.0887 0.0844 0.0686 0.0580 0.0620 0.0545 0.0842
(0.054) (0.062) (0.061) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.061)
MARFIN 0.7487 0.8135 0.7034 0.7925 0.7195 0.7479 0.6995 0.7197
(0.516) (0.575) (0.580) (0.512) (0.524) (0.515) (0.523) (0.601)
NONCOM 0.1182 0.1763 0.0940 0.0881 0.0339 0.0888 0.1621 0.3044




















1) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industrial dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 488 410 412 485 484 490 491 401
Pseudo R
2 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17












1 Including all the independent variables used for Model (D).
Source: Author's estimation.
OUTCHA
Logit ML Logit ML Logit ML Logit ML Logit ML Logit ML




2 The figures in parentheses show the White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *:










(0.103) (0.295) (0.308) (0.113) (0.203) (0.298)
Endogenous variables
BOASIZ 0.1333 -0.2120 0.1958 -0.1229

















































































Industrial dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 536 536 536 403 403 403
Adj. R









Hausman specification test (χ
2)
  vs. OLS 16.86 5.56 34.92
*** 42.38
*** 7.57 11.74
  vs. 2SLS (by equation) 0.32 2.65 0.63 1.76 7.07 1.97
  vs. 2SLS (by system) 1.86 3.75
Source: Author's estimation.
Note: The figures in parentheses show standard errors. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant
at the 10% level.
Table 13. 3SLS system estimates of board composition taking the possible endogeneity of board size,




BOASIZ SHAOUT OUTCHA BOASIZ OUTCHA SHAOUT